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A KNOWLEDGE THEORY OF
TACIT AGREEMENT
WENTONG ZHENG*
A persistent puzzle in antitrust law is whether and when an unlawful agree-
ment could arise from conduct or verbalized communications that fall short of
an explicit agreement. While courts have found such tacit agreements to exist in
idiosyncratic scenarios, they have failed to articulate a clear and consistent
logic for such findings. This Article attempts to fill this gap by proposing a uni-
fied theory of tacit agreement. It defines a tacit agreement as an agreement
formed by non-explicit communications that enable the alleged coconspirators
to have constructive knowledge of one another's conspiratory intent. This ap-
proach to tacit agreement is more faithful to the conceptual integrity and the
statutory meaning of the agreement requirement under the Sherman Act. More
importantly, it provides a flexible yet consistent formula for determining tacit
agreements. This formula could be applied to any factual scenarios, including
conscious parallelism, parallel conduct preceded by suggestive communications,
hub-and-spoke conspiracy, and facilitating practices.
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INTRODUCTION
Agreement figures prominently in antitrust law.' Section 1 of the Sher-
man Act prohibits "[e]very contract, combination . . . or conspiracy" in
restraint of trade. 2 An essential element of a Section 1 violation is an agree-
ment among two or more firms to engage in anticompetitive conduct.3 Sec-
tion 2 of the Sherman Act condemns monopolization and attempts of
monopolization, as well as "combin[ation] or conspir[acy]" to monopo-
lize. 4 As under Section 1, an agreement among two or more firms must be
proved to sustain a challenge under the conspiracy portion of Section 2.1
Among all agreements, horizontal agreements among competitors, or
"cartels," are the "supreme evil of antitrust." 6 Particularly, "'hard-core' car-
tels," such as "price-fixing, output restrictions, market-sharing[,] and bid-
rigging" are considered a significant economic problem.7 Antitrust enforce-
ment authorities around the world devote considerable resources and efforts
to rooting out cartels, with punishments ranging from fines to criminal im-
prisonment.' Cartels are also the subjects of high-profile civil cases filed by
private plaintiffs, with settlements or verdicts often reaching hundreds of
millions of dollars. 9
While cartels have been the primary target of antitrust law, there is a
great deal of uncertainty over what exactly constitutes an agreement. If one
alleged coconspirator approached another and said, "I will raise my price if
you raise yours," and the other said "deal," such an explicit exchange of
'See James A. Rahl, Conspiracy and the Anti-Trust Lws, 44 ILL. L. REv. 743, 744
(1950).
2 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2019). "'The three quoted terms are understood to embrace a single
concept,' which is generally referred to as an agreement." Louis KAPLow, COMPETITON POL-
ICY AND PRICE FIXING 70 (2013) (quoting 6 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP,
ANTITRUST LAW 16 (2d ed. 2003)).
See HERBERT HovENKAMP, FEDERAL ArirrlTusT POLICY: THE LAW OF COMPETITION
AND ITS PRACTICE § 4.2 (4th ed. 2011).
4 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2019).
See Rahl, supra note 1, at 748.
6 Verizon Communications v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, 540 U.S. 398, 408 (2004).
Brendan Sweeney, The Role of Damages in Regulating Horizontal Price-Fixing: Com-
paring the Situation in the United States, Europe and Australia, 30 MELBOURNE UNIV. L. REv.
837, 838 (2006).
8 See Thomas 0. Barnett, Assistant Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice Antitrust Div.,
Glob. Antitrust Enf't, Address at the Georgetown Law Global Antitrust Enforcement Sympo-
sium (Sept. 26, 2007), (available at https://www.justice.gov/atr/speech/global-antitrust-en-
forcement). For an overview of cartels enforcement in the United States, see Vivek Ghosal &
D. Daniel Sokol, The Evolution of U.S. Cartel Enforcement, 57 J. L. & ECON. S51 (2014).
' For example, in July 2012, Visa, Inc., Mastercard, Inc., and some large banks agreed to
pay six billion dollars to settle a price-fixing lawsuit filed by retailers. See Robin Sidel &
Andrew R. Johnson, Card Giants to Pay $6 Billion, WALL ST. J. (July 14, 2012), https://www
.wsj.com/articles/SB 10001424052702303919504577525284273006706.
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assurances of common action is certainly an agreement.' 0 But what if the
alleged coconspirators all said, "I will raise my price no matter whether you
raise yours," and then all of them raised their prices?" And what if the
alleged coconspirators said nothing but followed one another in raising
prices, thinking that everybody knew it would be in their best interests to
raise prices? 2 In the latter two scenarios, if there is an agreement at all, it is
reached only in a tacit manner.
But does the Sherman Act reach tacit agreements? If yes, how should
such tacit agreements be ascertained? So far, courts have been ambivalent on
these questions. The Supreme Court includes tacit agreements within the
scope of agreements punishable under the Sherman Act, 3 but it is not clear
what the Court means by that.1 4 Courts have held that, at least in certain
factual scenarios, a Sherman Act agreement could be formed by conduct or
verbalized communications that fall short of explicit agreements." But
courts have not been able to articulate a clear and consistent rationale for
such findings, other than stating a general requirement that there be "direct
or circumstantial evidence" that the alleged coconspirators had a "conscious
commitment to a common scheme designed to achieve an unlawful
purpose." 6
The uncertainty over tacit agreement in case law is compounded by
divergent views of tacit agreement by legal scholars. Some scholars advo-
cate recognition of explicit agreements only," some want to expand tacit
agreements to include interdependent conduct," and some others propose
definitions of tacit agreement based on whether the communication at issue
confers benefits on third parties." One fundamental problem with all of
these approaches, however, is that they ignore the alleged coconspirators'
conspiratory intent, which is at the core of the Sherman Act's agreement
requirement.
The Article proposes a new approach to tacit agreement. It defines a
tacit agreement as an agreement formed by non-explicit communications,
10 Cf HOVENKAMP, supra note 3, § 5.4a2.
" This is essentially the fact pattern in United States v. Foley, 598 F.2d 1323 (4th Cir.
1979). For more discussions of Foley, see infra Part 1.C.1.
12 This is the problem of "conscious parallelism," or "a common reaction of firms in a
concentrated market that recognize their shared economic interests and their interdependence
with respect to price and output decisions ..... Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,
553-54 (2007).
" See Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 553 ("[Tlhe crucial question is
whether the challenged anticompetitive conduct stems from independent decision or from an
agreement, tacit or express." (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added).
'4 See infra notes 47-50 and accompanying text.
'5 See infra Part I.C.
16 Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 768 (1984).
1 This Article refers to this approach as the minimalist approach. See infra Part H.A.
18 This is the expansive approach, advocated primarily by Judge Richard Posner and Louis
Kaplow. See infra Part U.B.
19 This middle-ground approach recognizes the concept of tacit agreement but attempts to
limit it to certain special scenarios. See infra Part I.C.
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including both actions and non-explicit verbalized communications, that en-
able coconspirators to have constructive knowledge of one another's con-
spiratory intent. Under this "knowledge" theory, proof of coconspirators'
constructive knowledge of one another's conspiratory intent comes from
proof of what a reasonable person would have known from the non-explicit
communication at issue. If the circumstances of the non-explicit communi-
cation, including its content, timing, place, and manner, are of such a nature
that a reasonable person would conclude that the communication is made to
convey the sender's conspiratory intent and has a reasonable likelihood of
reaching the targeted recipient, then the recipient of the communication
would be considered to have constructive knowledge of the sender's con-
spiratory intent, irrespective of what the recipient actually knows. 20 This ap-
proach to tacit agreement is more faithful to the conceptual integrity and the
statutory meaning of the agreement requirement under the Sherman Act.
More importantly, it provides a flexible, yet consistent, formula for deter-
mining tacit agreements that could be applied to any factual scenario.
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I surveys the current state of case
law on unlawful agreements and pays particular attention to factual scena-
rios that courts have held may give rise to a tacit agreement. Part H discusses
the existing approaches to tacit agreement and their shortcomings. Part El
lays out the knowledge theory of tacit agreement and explains why it is
superior to the existing approaches. Part IV applies the knowledge theory to
four highly contested legal issues: conscious parallelism, parallel conduct
preceded by suggestive communications, hub-and-spoke conspiracy, and fa-
cilitating practices.
I. AGREEMENT IN ANTITRUST LAW
While the existence of an agreement is a central requirement under the
Sherman Act, it is by no means easy to determine when an agreement arises.
Courts generally define an agreement as "a unity of purpose, a common
design and understanding, a meeting of the minds, or a conscious commit-
ment to a common scheme." 2 ' But courts have been ambivalent on the forms
such an agreement could take. This Part briefly describes three kinds of
agreements that have been recognized by courts: explicit agreement, inferred
explicit agreement, and tacit agreement.
20 See infra Part III.
21 Am. Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 810 (1946); see also Copperweld
Corp. v. Indep. Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 771 (1984); W. Penn Allegheny Health Sys., Inc. v.
UPMC, 627 F.3d 85, 99 (3d Cir. 2010).
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A. Explicit Agreement
An easy case in which to find an agreement is when the alleged facts fit
the traditional notion of an explicit agreement, namely, an agreement in
which "the defendants got together and exchanged assurances of common
action." 22 In United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., Inc., for example, the
defendant oil producers entered into an "informal gentlemen's agreement or
understanding whereby each undertook to perform his share of the joint un-
dertaking" to effectuate an increase in spot and retail gasoline prices. 23 It is
generally accepted that explicit agreements like this are sufficient for Sher-
man Act purposes. 24
B. Inferred Explicit Agreement
Beyond the immediate confine of explicit agreements, courts have also
inferred agreements from indirect, circumstantial evidence of concerted ac-
tion.25 This approach is made necessary by the secret nature of illegal agree-
ments, the evidence of which is often not obtainable. 26 Whether an
agreement could be inferred from circumstantial evidence turns on whether
there are plausible explanations for defendants' conduct other than an agree-
ment.27 In cases involving inferred explicit agreements, the hurdle facing
plaintiffs is evidentiary, not conceptual, because these cases still allege the
existence of an explicit, albeit unknown, agreement. 28
The Supreme Court appeared to suggest in an early case that agree-
ments reachable under the Sherman Act might go beyond explicit and in-
ferred explicit agreements. In American Tobacco Co. v. United States, the
Supreme Court held that a jury could have reasonably found that three major
tobacco producers conspired to fix prices based on evidence of the tobacco
2 2 
PHIu E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF ANn-
TRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION ¶ 1434b (4th ed. 2018).
23 310 U.S. 150, 179 (1940).
24 See George A. Hay, Horizontal Agreements: Concept and Proof, 51 ANTrrRUST BULL.
877, 881 (2006).
25 See Randall David Marks, Can Conspiracy Theory Solve the "Oligopoly Problem"?, 45
MD. L. REV. 387, 413-18 (1986). For example, in C-O-Two Fire Equipment Co. v. United
States, the Ninth Circuit inferred an agreement from circumstantial evidence pointing to the
existence of a conspiracy among defendants to fix prices of fire extinguishers. See 197 F.2d
489, 493-97 (9th Cir. 1952). Such evidence included "meetings among the defendants ...
standardization of a product that is not naturally standardized, industry-wide resale price main-
tenance, identical sealed bids from all four companies on at least two occasions, an attempt by
one firm to withdraw a mistaken bid that was slightly lower than those of its rivals, uniform
delivered pricing, and price increase despite a surplus of extinguishers on the market." Marks,
supra at 414 (internal citations omitted).
26 See Alaska Elec. Pension Fund v. Bank of Am. Corp., 175 F.Supp.3d 44, 54 (S.D.N.Y.
Mar. 28, 2016) ("[Cloncrete, 'smoking gun' proof of an illegal conspiracy between sophisti-
cated actors 'can be hard to come by, especially at the pleadings stage.' ") (internal citation
omitted).
27 See Hay, supra note 24, at 883.
2 See Marks, supra note 25, at 418.
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producers' parallel business conduct.29 Noting that the alleged conspiracy
was proved "from the evidence of the action taken in concert by the parties
to it," the Court declared that "[t]he essential combination or conspiracy in
violation of the Sherman Act may be found in a course of dealings or other
circumstances . . ."30
While the language used by the Court in American Tobacco suggests
that parallel conduct itself may constitute an agreement under the Sherman
Act, the facts and circumstances of the case make it more likely that the
Court only meant to say that parallel conduct could be evidence from which
to infer an explicit agreement.31 The schemes the American Tobacco defend-
ants established to avoid competition were so elaborate that it is inconceiv-
able that they came about without an explicit agreement, even though direct
evidence of the explicit agreement was not available.3 2 Thus, the peculiar
facts in American Tobacco would still put the case in the category of inferred
explicit agreements.33
The Supreme Court has repeatedly clarified in subsequent cases that
parallel conduct alone does not conclusively establish an agreement under
the Sherman Act. In Theatre Enterprises, Inc. v. Paramount Film Distribut-
ing Corp., decided eight years after American Tobacco, the Court rebuffed a
plaintiffs efforts to win a directed verdict against the defendants based on
evidence of conscious uniformity of action by the defendants. 4 The Court
2 9 See 328 U.S. 781, 798-811 (1946). The jury found that the defendants conspired to fix
prices in the purchase of raw materials and in the sale of finished products. See id. at 798. In
upholding the jury verdict, the Court cited evidence of highly uniform conduct among the
defendants, including their refusal to purchase tobacco on new tobacco markets unless all of
the defendants were represented, their bidding the price of tobacco up to a uniform level, their
identical list prices and discounts over a period of years, their selling of some brands at a loss
to exclude cheaper competition, followed by price rises, and the declining market shares of the
leaders. See id. at 798-811.
30 Id. at 809-10.
3 Under this interpretation, when the Court said that an agreement may be "found in a
course of dealings," the Court meant that a course of dealings could be evidence of a hidden
explicit agreement, not that the course of dealings itself constitutes an agreement. See gener-
ally id.
32 See Marks, supra note 25, at 403 ("[Tihe economic evidence of parallel behavior of-
fered in American Tobacco almost shouted the presence of hidden collusive conduct.") (inter-
nal citation omitted). Donald Turner believed that the parallel conduct in American Tobacco
"might well arise in an oligopoly situation ... without overt communication or agreement, but
solely through a rational calculation by each seller of what the consequences of his price
decision would be, taking into account the probable or virtually certain reactions of his com-
petitors." Donald F. Turner, The Definition of Agreement Under the Sherman Act: Conscious
Parallelism and Refusals to Deal, 75 HARV. L. REV. 655, 661 (1962) (internal citation
omitted).
" Eugene Rostow would infer an agreement not only from the parallel conduct of the
defendants in American Tobacco, but also from the monopoly position of those defendants
alone. See Eugene V. Rostow, The New Sherman Act: A Positive Instrument of Progress, 14 U.
Cm. L. REV. 567, 585 (1947) ("When three companies produce so large a percentage of mar-
ket supply, that fact alone is almost sufficient evidence that the statute is violated.").
' Theatre Enter., Inc. v. Paramount Film Distrib. Corp., 346 U.S. 537, 540-42 (1954).
The plaintiff alleged a conspiracy among defendant motion picture producer-distributors to
"restrict first-run pictures to downtown Baltimore theatres" and thus confine the plaintiff's
404 [ Vol. 9
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stated that it had "never held that proof of parallel business behavior conclu-
sively establishes agreement or, phrased differently, that such behavior itself
constitutes a Sherman Act offense."35 Instead, the Court held that
"[c]ircumstantial evidence of consciously parallel behavior may have made
heavy inroads into the traditional judicial attitude toward conspiracy; but
'conscious parallelism' has not yet read conspiracy out of the Sherman Act
entirely.""6 Subsequently, in Matsushita Electrical Industrial Co., Ltd. v.
Zenith Radio Corp., the Court held that evidence of parallel conduct alone
would not survive a defendant's motion for summary judgment or for a di-
rected verdict.37 Most recently, in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, the Court
went a step further by holding that an allegation of parallel business conduct
and a bare assertion of conspiracy alone would not even survive a defen-
dant's motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Section 1 of the
Sherman Act.38 In so holding, the Court emphasized that 'conscious paral-
lelism,' a common reaction of 'firms in a concentrated market that recognize
their shared economic interests and their interdependence with respect to
price and output decisions' is 'not in itself unlawful."' 39
The Supreme Court's reluctance to treat conscious parallelism as agree-
ment stems in no small part from Donald Turner's widely accepted views on
oligopolistic behavior.40 In an influential article,41 Turner argues that identi-
cal pricing behavior "might well arise in an 'oligopoly' situation (i.e., where
sellers are few) without overt communication or agreement, but solely
through a rational calculation by each seller of what the consequences of his
price decision would be, taking into account the probable or virtually certain
reactions of his competitors." 4 2 To Turner, this type of interdependent pricing
could be deemed a type of collusion, if "considered purely as a problem in
linguistic definition." 43 But since "the rational oligopolist is behaving in ex-
theater to subsequent-run status. Id. at 538. There was no direct evidence of an illegal agree-
ment among the defendants; instead, defendants acted independently of each other in denying
the plaintiff's request. See id. 539-40.
35 Id. at 541.
36 Id. Theatre Enterprises and American Tobacco could be reconciled by their different
procedural postures. The Court in Theatre Enterprises held that evidence of parallel conduct
alone would not prevent the case from going to the jury, but it did not hold that a jury could
not infer an agreement from evidence of parallel conduct alone. See Turner, supra note 33, at
657.
3 See 475 U.S. 574, 588 (1986) ("To survive a motion for summary judgment or for a
directed verdict, a plaintiff seeking damages for a violation of § 1 must present evidence 'that
tends to exclude the possibility' that the alleged conspirators acted independently.").
38 See 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007).
39 Id. at 553-54.
' In Twombly, the Court cited Turner's work as support for its holding that conscious
parallelism is not in itself unlawful. See id. at 554.
41 See Turner, supra note 32.
4 2 Id. at 661.
43 Id. at 665. Economists refer to this type of interdependent pricing as "tacit collusion."
See EDWARD J. GREEN, ROBERT C. MARSHALL & LESLE M. MARX, Tacit Collusion in Oligop-
oly, in 2 THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL ANTrrrUST EcONOMIcs 464, 493 (Roger
D. Blair & D. Daniel Sokol eds., 2015) (internal citation omitted).
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actly the same way as the rational seller in a competitively structured indus-
try," oligopolistic behavior "can be described as individual behavior-
rational individual decision in the light of relevant economic facts-as well
as it can be described as 'agreement."'"
C. Tacit Agreement
If conscious parallelism does not constitute an agreement under the
Sherman Act, is there any conduct that would constitute an agreement and
yet fall short of an explicit or inferred explicit agreement? The Supreme
Court appears to believe that such conduct exists. In Twombly, the Court
stated that "the crucial question is whether the challenged anticompetitive
conduct stems from independent decision or from an agreement, tacit or ex-
press."45 The Court's inclusion of "tacit agreement" within the scope of
agreement under the Sherman Act, in a sentence right before the one in
which it declared that conscious parallelism is not an agreement, 46 has
caused a great amount of angst among jurists. 4 7 Judge Cecilia Altonaga be-
lieves that the Court's reference to tacit agreement in Twombly was inconsis-
tent with the rest of the opinion and was, therefore, a mistake.48 In her
opinion, by "tacit agreement," the Court meant conscious parallelism. 49
But case law indicates that the Court may not have been mistaken in
referring to tacit agreement in Twombly. In at least three factual scenarios,
courts have held that certain conduct could constitute an agreement even
though it does not establish an explicit agreement. 0 These three factual sce-
narios involve parallel conduct preceded by suggestive communications,
hub-and-spoke conspiracy, and parallel conduct with facilitating practices,
respectively.
1. Parallel Conduct Preceded by Suggestive Communications
One factual scenario that may give rise to a tacit agreement under case
law is when parallel conduct by rivals is preceded by suggestive communi-
"Turner, supra note 32, at 665-66.
4 Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 553 (2007) (internal citation omitted) (em-
phasis added).
4 In the next sentence, the Court stated: "While a showing of parallel business behavior is
admissible circumstantial evidence from which the fact finder may infer agreement, it falls
short of conclusively establishing agreement or itself constituting a Sherman Act offense." Id.
(internal citation omitted).
47 See, e.g., E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Fed. Trade Comm'n, 729 F.2d 128, 143 (2d
Cir. 1984) (Lumbard, J., concurring) ("[T]hat accommodating word, 'tacit,' . . . has created a
hole in the agreement requirement large enough at times to swallow it entirely.").
48 See In re Florida Cement & Concrete Antitrust Litig., 746 F. Supp. 2d 1291, 1308-09
n.13 (S.D. Fla. 2010).
49 See id.
'o See infra Part I.C.
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cations that do not themselves form an explicit agreement. In Esco Corp. v.
United States, the Ninth Circuit described one such scenario:
Let us suppose five competitors meet on several occasions,
discuss their problems, and one finally states-"I won't fix prices
with any of you, but here is what I am going to do-put the price
of my gidget at X dollars; now you all do what you want." He then
leaves the meeting. Competitor number two says-"I don't care
whether number one does what he says he's going to do or not; nor
do I care what the rest of you do, but I am going to price my gidget
at X dollars." Number three makes a similar statement-"My
price is X dollars." Number four says not one word. All leave and
fix their prices at "X" dollars.5 1
According to the Ninth Circuit, this scenario presents sufficient evi-
dence for a jury to find a conspiracy.5 2 The court stated that written or oral
assurances are unnecessary for a Sherman Act agreement "if a course of
conduct, or a price schedule, once suggested or outlined by a competitor in
the presence of other competitors, is followed by all-generally and custom-
arily-and continuously for all practical purposes, even though there be
slight variations.""
In United States v. Foley, 4 the Fourth Circuit was confronted with es-
sentially the same scenario as the one described in Esco. In Foley, six corpo-
rate and three individual defendants were accused of conspiracy to fix real
estate commissions. 5 The defendants wanted to raise their commission rate
from six to seven percent, but a previous attempt by one of them failed
because of competition." Then, one defendant, Mr. Foley, hosted a dinner
attended by those he regarded as the most active members of his profes-
sion." The court described what happened at the dinner, and afterwards, as
follows:
At the dinner Foley rose, made some prefatory remarks and
then stated that his firm was in dire financial condition. Saying
that he did not care what the others did, he then announced that his
firm was changing its commission rate from six percent to seven
percent. Testimony about what was said by various persons in the
ensuing discussion is greatly in conflict, but there was evidence
5 340 F.2d 1000, 1007 (9th Cir. 1965).
52 Id. ("We do not say the foregoing illustration compels an inference in this case that the
competitors' conduct constituted a price-fixing conspiracy, including an agreement to so con-
spire, but neither can we say, as a matter of law, that an inference of no agreement is com-
pelled.") (emphasis added).
* See id. at 1008.
* 598 F.2d 1323 (4th Cir. 1979).
1 See id. at 1326.
"
6 See id. at 1331-32.
5 See id. at 1332.
4072019]
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from which the jury could find that each of the individual defend-
ants and a representative of each corporate defendant not repre-
sented by one of the individual defendants expressed an intention
or gave the impression that his firm would adopt a similar change.
The discussion also included reference to the earlier unsuccessful
effort by [one defendant] to adopt a seven percent policy, from
which the jury could conclude that defendants knew that their co-
operation was essential. Evidence . . . showed that in the months
following each defendant did in fact begin to take substantial num-
bers of seven percent listings. Moreover, the jury heard testimony
of a number of instances in which members of the conspiracy
sought after the September 5 dinner to hold their fellows to the
"agreement." 5
This sequence of events, according to the Fourth Circuit, was sufficient for a
jury to find a conspiracy among the defendants.5 9
In Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., the Supreme Court characterized Foley
as a case where antitrust liability is premised upon "little more than uniform
behavior among competitors, preceded by conversations implying that later
uniformity might prove desirable."6 0 Although the Court did not use the term
"tacit agreement" in describing Foley, it appears that the Court recognized
that Foley involves an agreement formed by conduct, not an explicit or in-
ferred explicit agreement.6'
2. Hub-and-Spoke Conspiracy
A second factual scenario in which courts have found an agreement
formed by conduct involves an agreement among a group of competitors that
respond "in an identical fashion to a demand by a party standing in a vertical
relationship to them." 62 In Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States, the Su-
preme Court held that a group of motion picture distributors entered into a
conspiracy among themselves when members of the group independently
complied with demands by defendant first-run movie theater groups for re-
strictions on licenses for subsequent-run theaters. 63 The letter sent to each
defendant distributor in which the demands were made listed all defendant
distributors as addressees." The Court held that the district court's inference
of an explicit agreement among the defendant distributors was supported by
58 Id.
" Id. at 1331 ("Our review of the evidence leads to the conclusion that under applicable
standards of review the evidence was sufficient to sustain the jury findings on these issues.").
"518 U.S. 231, 241 (1996).
61 The Court appeared to suggest that the later uniform conduct completed an agreement
initiated by the earlier suggestive conversations. See generally id.
62 Turner, supra note 32, at 695.
63 See 306 U.S. 208, 221 (1939).
* See id. at 215-17.
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evidence on the record. 65 But the Court went on to state that "in the circum-
stances of this case [an alleged explicit] agreement for the imposition of the
restrictions upon subsequent-run exhibitors was not a prerequisite to an un-
lawful conspiracy."6 To the Court, "[ilt was enough that, knowing that con-
certed action was contemplated and invited, the distributors gave their
adherence to the scheme and participated in it." 6 7 The Court emphasized that
"[e]ach distributor was advised that the others were asked to participate;
each knew that cotiperation was essential to successful operation of the
plan." 68 The Court concluded that "[a]cceptance by competitors, without
previous agreement, of an invitation to participate in a plan, the necessary
consequence of which, if carried out, is restraint of interstate commerce, is
sufficient to establish an unlawful conspiracy under the Sherman Act." 69
The Court's dictum in Interstate Circuit describes what is often referred
to as a "hub-and-spoke" conspiracy. 0 Under such a conspiracy, a firm (the
hub) organizes a horizontal agreement (the rim) among upstream or down-
stream firms through a series of vertical agreements (the spokes).7 1 The up-
stream or downstream firms never communicate directly with one another,
but they are nonetheless considered to have established a tacit agreement
among themselves when the vertical agreements "coordinate the interdepen-
dent responses of the rivals by providing strategic information that each re-
cipient knows its rivals are also receiving."72 Since Interstate Circuit, courts
have reaffirmed the notion of hub-and-spoke conspiracy in cases.73
The Court was unequivocal that the agreement found in Interstate Cir-
cuit went beyond the traditional explicit or inferred explicit agreement. In
addition to stating that an alleged explicit agreement was "not a prerequisite
65 See id. at 221 (noting that the evidence from which the district court inferred an agree-
ment included the nature of the proposals made by the defendant first-run movie theater
groups, the manner in which the proposals were made, the uniformity of the action by the
defendant distributors, and the fact that the distributors did not call as witnesses any executives
who negotiated with the defendant first-run movie theater groups and would have known the
existence or non-existence of such an agreement among distributors).
6 Id. at 226.
67 Id.
68 Id.
69 Id. at 227.7
o See Barak Orbach, Hub-and-Spoke Conspiracies, ANTITRusT SOURCE 1 (Apr. 2016),
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publishinglantitrust-source/aprl6_orbach_4
1 lf.pdf (describing hub-and-spoke conspiracies).
71 See William H. Page, Tacit Agreement Under Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 81 ArTi-
TRUST L.J. 593, 624 (2017).
72 Id.
7 See, e.g., United States v. Masonite Corp., 316 U.S. 265, 276 (1942) (finding that a
price-fixing conspiracy was established by a series of vertical agency agreements in which a
patentee licensed rival manufacturers to distribute its products at prices set by the patentee);
Toys "R" US, Inc. v. Fed. Trade Comm'n, 221 F.3d 928, 936 (7th Cit. 2000) (finding that
manufacturers formed a horizontal agreement by acceding to a dominant retailer's demand to
boycott retail warehouse clubs); United States v. Apple, Inc., 791 F.3d 290, 316 (2d Cir. 2015)
(finding that Apple orchestrated a conspiracy among e-book publishers to raise the retail price
of e-books by entering into agency contracts with the publishers with a most-favored-nation
clause).
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to an unlawful conspiracy," the Court in Interstate Circuit said that a con-
spiracy existed when competitors accepted an invitation, "without previous
agreement," to participate in an anticompetitive plan. 7 4 The Court's inclusion
of the phrase "without previous agreement" made it clear that the Court was
not looking at the conduct at issue as evidence of a hidden explicit agree-
ment. 7 5 Rather, the conduct itself constituted an agreement.
3. Parallel Conduct With Facilitating Practices
A third factual scenario where courts have attributed an agreement to
conduct involves facilitating practices in oligopoly industries. 76 The concept
of facilitating practices refers to "specific actions taken by firms to make
coordination easier or more effective without the need for an explicit agree-
ment."77 The need for facilitating practices arises when there are structural
hurdles to effective coordination among competitors, such as non-standard-
ized products78 and non-transparent prices. 79 Actions taken to overcome
these structural hurdles will facilitate effective coordination among competi-
tors, making it unnecessary for competitors to enter into explicit price-fixing
agreements. The most common facilitating practices include arrangements
among competitors to exchange historic or future price information and pric-
ing systems that facilitate collusive outcomes.s0
The adoption of facilitating practices by competitors could be pursuant
to an explicit agreement. When this is the case, courts have held that such an
agreement violates Section 1 of the Sherman Act."' A more subtle question,
however, is whether facilitating practices could allow inference of a tacit
agreement from the underlying parallel conduct that facilitating practices
make possible. For instance, if all competitors adopt a practice of publicly
74 Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States, 306 U.S. 208, 226-27 (1939).
7 See id.
76 For general discussions of facilitating practices, see ORGANIZATION FOR EcONOMIC Co-
OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT [OECD], POLicy ROUNDTABLES: FACILITATING PRACTICES IN
OLIGOPOLTEs (2008), https://www.oecd.org/daf/competition/41472165.pdf.
7 George A. Hay, Facilitating Practices 13 (Cornell Law Sch. Legal Studies Research
Paper No. 05-029), https://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=811404.
" When products are not standardized, it will be more difficult for competitors to agree on
a particular price for their products even if they want to agree. See id. at 14.
79 When prices are not transparent, there will be incentives for individual members of a
price-fixing cartel to cheat by offering a price that is slightly lower than the cartel price. See id.
at 15.
so See OECD, supra note 76, at 9.
" See, e.g., Fed. Trade Comm'n v. Cement Inst., 333 U.S. 684 (1948) (holding that the
defendants' agreement to utilize a multiple basing point delivered price system was illegal
under Section 1 of the Sherman Act); Nat'l Macaroni Mfrs. Ass'n v. Fed. Trade Comm'n, 345
F.2d 421 (7th Cir. 1965) (holding that an agreement among the dominant firms in the macaroni
industry to fix composition of their product violated Section 1 of the Sherman Act); United
States v. Container Corp., 393 U.S. 333 (1969) (holding that an agreement between relatively
few dominant sellers of corrugated containers to give to each other on request information
about most recent price charged or quoted violated the Sherman Act).
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announcing their price changes, could that constitute evidence of a tacit
agreement among the competitors to fix price?
The Ninth Circuit tackled this question in the Petroleum Products case,
a private treble damage action filed by several states against a group of ma-
jor oil companies. 82 Plaintiffs in that case alleged, among other things, that
the defendant oil companies conspired to raise or stabilize prices for refined
oil products in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act." Among the evi-
dence presented by plaintiffs as proof of the price-fixing conspiracy was
evidence that the defendants were engaged in various practices whereby they
disseminated information concerning their wholesale prices." Plaintiffs ar-
gued that not only were these price dissemination practices themselves con-
spiratorially adopted, but they were probative of a conspiracy to fix or
stabilize gasoline prices." The Ninth Circuit agreed. 86 The court acknowl-
edged that "mere proof of interdependent pricing, standing alone, may not
serve as proof of an antitrust violation."8 7 But, according to the court, "the
evidence concerning the purpose and effect of price announcements, when
considered together with the evidence concerning the parallel pattern of
price restorations, is sufficient to support a reasonable and permissible infer-
ence of an agreement, whether express or tacit, to raise or stabilize prices."88
This is so because "the public dissemination of such information served lit-
tle purpose other than to facilitate interdependent or collusive price coordi-
nation." 9 The court's reference to tacit agreement suggested that facilitating
practices, together with the parallel conduct they facilitate, might themselves
constitute an agreement on the parallel conduct. 0
The foregoing analysis indicates that courts have recognized, in idio-
syncratic situations, that a Sherman Act agreement could be formed by con-
duct or by non-explicit verbalized communications. However, courts have
not been consistent in the language they have used to describe such an agree-
" See generally In re Coordinated Pretrial Proceedings in Petroleum Products Antitrust
Litigation, 906 F.2d 432 (9th Cir. 1990).
8 See id. at 436.
* The defendants' price dissemination practices included the practice of publicly announc-
ing, in press releases, their decisions to withdraw dealer discounts and to restore official dealer
prices, as well as the practice of publicly posting their official dealer prices and any applicable
dealer discounts. See id. at 445, 449.
8' See id. at 445.
86 See id. at 445-50.
87 Id. at 446.
8 Id. at 446-47 (emphasis added).
8 Id. at 448. The court held that it "conclusion would necessarily be different were the
appellants' inference of a price-fixing conspiracy based on the dissemination or advertisement
of retail prices . . . ." Id. at 448 n.14 (emphasis in original).
' As George Hay points out, there are two agreements that need to be distinguished from
one another: "[T]he court invoked the notion of agreement twice: the parties agreed (either
implicitly or explicitly) to facilitate an agreement (explicit or tacit) on price." Hay, supra note
77, at 20.
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ment.9 1 The Supreme Court in Twombly included tacit agreement within the
scope of agreement under the Sherman Act,92 but it appears that by tacit
agreement, the Court really meant inferred explicit agreement.93 In some
other cases, the Court referred to the agreement at issue in Interstate Circuit
as a tacit agreement.94
In White v. R.M. Packer Co., the First Circuit offered a definition of
tacit agreement. 5 According to the First Circuit, a tacit agreement is "one in
which only the conspirators' actions, and not any express communications,
indicate the existence of an agreement."96 But even this relatively concise
definition is ambiguous. On one hand, it could mean that a tacit agreement is
an explicit agreement whose existence is inferred from the defendants' con-
duct. On the other hand, it could also mean that the defendants' conduct
itself constitutes a tacit agreement. Frustrated with the ambiguity of the term,
some commentators choose not to use the term at all.'7
HI. EXISTING APPROACHES To TACIT AGREEMENT
As discussed above, in addition to explicit agreements, courts recognize
agreements formed by conduct or non-explicit verbalized communications.
Whether courts should call this kind of agreement "tacit agreement" is a
question of semantics, not a question of substance. The substantive question
is where to draw the line between conduct or non-verbalized communica-
tions that form a tacit agreement and conduct or non-verbalized communica-
tions that do not. This Part reviews three existing approaches to this
91 See KAPLOW, supra note 2, at 45 ("Many, including the U.S. Supreme Court in both
earlier decisions and its most recent ... state that tacit agreements are sufficient, yet it is hard
to know what to make of these proclamations given the great ambiguity of the terms.").
92 Bell Ati. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 553 (2007) ("[T]he crucial question is
whether the challenged anticompetitive conduct stems from independent decision or from an
agreement, tacit or express.") (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added).
93 In Twombly, the Court stated that "when allegations of parallel conduct are set out in
order to make a § 1 claim, they must be placed in a context that raises a suggestion of a
preceding agreement, not merely parallel conduct that could just as well be independent ac-
tion." Id. at 557 (emphasis added). The reference to "preceding agreement" here indicates that
the Court was looking at parallel conduct as evidence from which the existence of an explicit
agreement could be inferred.
I See, e.g., First Nat'l Bank of Ariz. v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253, 287 (1968) ("This
Court held [in Interstate Circuit] that on the foregoing facts a tacit agreement to restrain
competition between the distributors could properly be inferred."); United States v. Citizens
and S. Nat'l Bank, 422 U.S. 86, 112 (1975) (citing Interstate Circuit as support for an allega-
tion of a tacit agreement).
1 See generally 635 F.3d 571, 576 (1st Cir. 2011). In White, several gasoline retailers on
Martha's Vineyard were sued for illegal price-fixing. Id. at 574-75. The district court granted
the defendants' summary judgment because plaintiffs only presented evidence of parallel pric-
ing, which the court considered legal absent an agreement to fix prices. See id. at 575. The
First Circuit affirmed. See id. at 590.
9 Id. at 576.
9 See, e.g., Gregory J. Werden, Economic Evidence on the Existence of Collusion: Recon-
ciling Antitrust Law with Oligopoly Theory, 71 ANTrRUST L.J. 719, 736 (2004) ("In the inter-
est of clarity, the descriptors 'tacit,' 'express,' and 'explicit' all are avoided.").
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question. The first approach refuses to treat tacit agreement as an agreement
at all. The second approach takes an expansive view of agreement and
equates essentially all interdependent conduct with tacit agreement. The
third approach seeks a middle ground by recognizing the concept of tacit
agreement, yet limiting it to certain special scenarios. As will be discussed
below, one common flaw of all three approaches is that they do not base the
existence of an agreement on the conspiratory intent of the alleged
conspirators.
A. The Minimalist Approach
One approach to tacit agreement is to not treat it as an illegal agreement
at all. Robert Bork holds a representative view of this approach and advo-
cates limiting the illegal agreement punishable under the Sherman Act to
cases of "explicit and detectable agreement." 8
Bork's objection to the notion of tacit agreement is in large part driven
by his perception that such agreement rarely occurs. As George Stigler elo-
quently demonstrated, a price-fixing cartel needs to overcome many hurdles
to accomplish a stable conspiracy.9 Members of the conspiracy must agree
on the price terms of the conspiracy and must devise a mechanism of de-
tecting significant deviations from the agreed-upon price."10 As a result, Bork
is doubtful that "concerted action without explicit collusion is likely to be at
all common or successful." 0 '
This minimalist approach to tacit agreement is in part predicated upon a
utilitarian judgment that a conspiracy that will eventually collapse on its own
is not worth the societal resources devoted to its eradication. But from a
conceptual point of view, the fact that tacit agreement might be more unsta-
ble does not make it less of an agreement. Many explicit agreements are
unstable and eventually fail, but that does not make them immune to attacks
under the Sherman Act."' 2
Furthermore, by rejecting the notion of tacit agreement altogether, the
minimalist approach sidesteps inquiries into conspirators' intent to enter into
an agreement. Such inquiries, however, are the most crucial factor in ascer-
* ROBERT H. BORK, THE ArrrRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF 175
(1978). Bork, however, accepts the position that indirect or circumstantial evidence may be
used to infer the existence of an explicit agreement. See id. ("There may be evidence of market
behavior that is consistent only with collusion, and that may of course be used to show
agreement.").
* See George J. Stigler, A Theory of Oligopoly, 72 J. POL. EcON. 45-46 (1964).
"n See id.
1o1 BORK, supra note 98, at 175. Similarly, Corwin Edwards is of the view that in indus-
tries involving a variety of products and pricing structures, parallel noncompetitive prices
could not be successfully maintained without formal collusion. See CORWIN D. EDWARDS,
MAINTAINING COMPETITION: REQUISITES OF A GOVERNMENTAL POLICY 33 (1949).
02 Stigler, supra note 99, at 46 ("The literature of collusive agreements ... is replete with
instances of the collapse of conspiracies because of 'secret' price-cutting.").
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taining agreement, as this Article will argue in Part III below.103 If conspira-
tors possess the requisite intent to enter into an agreement, but simply
choose to effectuate the agreement through implicit conduct, it is not clear
why they should be treated differently than if they effectuated the agreement
through verbalized communications." An agreement formed through an ex-
plicit exchange of assurances is conceptually indistinguishable from an
agreement formed by a wink or nod. 05 And, similarly, pure conduct could
constitute an acceptance of an offer under general contract law.'0 Theoreti-
cally, then, conduct could form an agreement in the same way as words do,
provided that the conduct is carried out with conspiratory intent. 0
B. The Expansive Approach
A second approach to tacit agreement is to take an expansive view of
agreement and include within its scope merely interdependent conduct. The
chief proponent of this approach is Judge Richard Posner, who is generally
critical of the interdependence theory of oligopoly pricing as espoused by
Donald Turner.'0 8 Unlike Turner, who views interdependent pricing as an
inevitable outcome of oligopolistic market structures,'" Judge Posner be-
lieves that oligopoly is a necessary but not sufficient condition for interde-
pendent pricing." 0 According to Judge Posner, an oligopolist must "make a
deliberate choice not to expand output to the point where the cost of the last
unit of output equals the market price, or, if he is at that point, to reduce
output.""' Moreover, if oligopolists decide to charge supracompetitive
prices, they have to undertake costly efforts to overcome the problems of
coordination and enforcement.11 2 In proving the existence of collusive pric-
ing, Posner emphasizes the use of "economic evidence"---evidence of mar-
ket structure and conduct-instead of evidence of overt acts of collusion." 3
103 See infra Part E.
" See Rahl, supra note 1, at 759 ("So long as assent to joint participation is manifest it
does not matter how it came about."). Indeed, it might be argued that a tacit agreement formed
by conduct should receive a harsher penalty than an explicit agreement because it is less likely
to be detected due to its surreptitious nature. See Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An
Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON. 169 (1968).
105 See Page, supra note 71, at 606 ("[A]n agreement formed by the intentional use of a
well-understood conventional signal like a nod can express assent and complete an agreement
in the same way as words.").
1 See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 53 (AM. LAW. INST. 1981).
07 For detailed discussions of how conspiratory intent could be ascertained, see infra Part
o0 See RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW 55-60 (2d ed. 2001).
'" See supra notes 41-44 and accompanying text.
11 See Richard A. Posner, Oligopoly and the Antitrust Laws: A Suggested Approach, 21
STAN. L. REV. 1562, 1571 (1968).
1 1 Id.
1 12 See id. at 1572.
113 See POSNER, supra note 108, at 79.
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If economic evidence supports a finding of collusion, Judge Posner be-
lieves that there is no legal or practical need to further inquire whether the
collusion is explicit or tacit.1 4 The economic evidence could allow an infer-
ence of an explicit agreement." Or alternatively, it could show tacit collu-
sion, formed by interdependent conduct.1 6 Judge Posner analogizes tacit
agreement in this context to a unilateral contract: "If someone advertises in a
newspaper that he will pay $10 to the person who finds and returns his dog,
anyone who meets the condition has an enforceable claim against him to the
promised reward. The finder's action in complying with the specified condi-
tion is all the indication of assent that the law requires for a binding con-
tract.""1 7 By the same logic, for tacit collusion, "one seller communicates his
'offer' by restricting output, and the offer is 'accepted' by the actions of his
rivals in restricting their outputs as well."" In re High Fructose Corn Syrup
Antitrust Litigation, Judge Posner reiterated this theory of tacit agreement:
"If a firm raises price in the expectation that its competitors will do likewise,
and they do, the firm's behavior can be conceptualized as the offer of a
unilateral contract that the offerees accept by raising their prices."" 9 How-
ever, Judge Posner acknowledged that this expansive view of tacit agreement
is not supported by case law.12 0
It is important to note that Judge Posner's legal approach to tacit agree-
ment is tantamount to treating interdependent conduct itself as a tacit agree-
ment. Under this approach, anyone who takes certain action while expecting
rivals to do the same is considered to possess the mental state required for an
agreement. But an agreement exists in this context only in the "linguistic" 2 '
or "metaphysical" 22 sense. As this Article will argue below, the mental state
required of a tacit agreement should be the same as that required of an ex-
114 See id. at 94.
"' See In re High Fructose Corn Syrup Antitrust Litigation, 295 F.3d 651, 654-55 (7th
Cir. 2002).
"' See id. at 654 ("Section 1 of the Sherman Act ... is broad enough ... to encompass a
purely tacit agreement to fix prices, that is, an agreement made without any actual communica-
tion among the parties to the agreement.") (citing JTC Petroleum Co. v. Piasa Motor Fuels,
Inc., 190 F.3d 775, 780 (7th Cir. 1999)).
" POSNER, supra note 108, at 94.
118 Id.
"9 High Fructose Corn Syrup, 295 F.3d at 654.
20 See id. ("Nevertheless it is generally believed ... that an express, manifested agree-
ment, and thus an agreement involving actual, verbalized communication, must be proved in
order for a price-fixing conspiracy to be actionable under the Sherman Act.").
121 See Turner, supra note 32, at 665 ("Considered purely as a problem in linguistic defini-
tion, there is no reason to exclude oligopolistic behavior from the scope of the term agreement
simply because the circumstances make it possible to communicate without speech.").
'" See George A. Hay, The Meaning of "Agreement" Under the Sherman Act: Thoughts
from the "Facilitating Practices" Experience, 16 REV. INDUS. ORG. 113, 116 (2000) ("If the
[Federal Trade] Commission were successful [in challenging parallel adoption of facilitating
practices as a violation of the Federal Trade Commission Act], it felt that an important new
weapon against oligopolistic industries would be achieved, a weapon which would not depend
on the occasionally metaphysical question of whether or not some kind of agreement
existed.").
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plicit agreement. That is, the alleged coconspirators should have to know
that they are participating in a common plan. A simple awareness of what
rivals would do does not rise to this level of knowledge.
A more fundamental problem with Judge Posner's legal approach to oli-
gopoly is that it is trumped by his economic approach to oligopoly, which
ignores the factor of intent altogether. This can be seen from what Judge
Posner himself considers to be "dangers" in pressing his legal approach too
far.123 To illustrate these dangers, Judge Posner gives a hypothetical example
whereby a group of competing firms simultaneously experiences common
cost increases.1 24 In deciding whether and how to respond to the cost in-
creases, each individual firm will have to take into account the likely re-
sponses of other firms-a hallmark of interdependent pricing.1 25 Judge
Posner concedes that under his legal approach, "[t]he process by which the
firms arrive at [a] new equilibrium at a higher price may thus have elements
of 'tacit agreement' . . ."126 This outcome would be problematic, according to
Judge Posner's economic approach to oligopoly, because price increases in
this context are not "anticompetitive."' 27 It is obvious that Judge Posner's
real criterion for determining the existence of a tacit agreement is economic
efficiency, not intent. Firms raising prices to adjust for common cost in-
creases and firms raising prices to simply make oligopolistic profits are
treated differently for purposes of determining whether they colluded, de-
spite possessing the same intent-and committing the same act-in raising
prices.
C. The Middle-Ground Approach
Yet another approach to tacit agreement attempts to strike a middle
ground between the minimalist approach and the expansive approach by rec-
ognizing the concept of tacit agreement and limiting it to certain particular
conduct. An example of this middle-ground approach is the approach taken
by the First Circuit in White.128 After defining tacit agreement as "one in
which only the conspirators' actions, and not any express communications,
indicate the existence of an agreement," 29 the First Circuit states that a tacit
agreement "is distinguished from mere conscious parallelism by 'uniform
behavior among competitors, preceded by conversations implying that later
uniformity might prove desirable or accompanied by other conduct that in
123 See POSNER, supra note 108, at 95.
'" See id.
* See id.
126 Id. In other words, these firms will be considered to have entered into a tacit agreement
to raise price if they all raise their prices in response to the common cost increases.
127 See id. Posner does not elaborate on what he means by "anticompetitive" in this con-
text. See id. But presumably, price increases in this context are not anticompetitive because
they are justified by the cost increases.
128 See supra notes 95-96 and accompanying text.
129 White v. R.M. Packer Co., 635 F.3d 571, 576 (1st Cir. 2011).
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context suggests that each competitor failed to make an independent deci-
sion."' 30 While this formulation suffers some logical incoherence regarding
whether a tacit agreement can involve express communications,131 it is an
effort to carve out a special category of conduct that will be considered capa-
ble of forming a tacit agreement.
Bill Page also adopts a middle ground approach to defining tacit agree-
ment.132 Page equates tacit agreement with what he terms "communicative
concerted action." 3 3 According to Page, "consciously parallel conduct be-
comes concerted if rivals achieve it, at least in part, by communicating their
intended actions and their reliance on others' actions."13 4 Page initially
"limit[ed the] communications" that would turn conscious parallelism into
a tacit agreement to "private oral or written communications as opposed to
public price announcements."13 In his more recent work, Page expanded his
concept of communications to include non-verbalized ones, such as ac-
tions.1 36 Page "arrange[s communications] in a [two-by-two] grid" based
on whether the audience of the communications is private or public and
whether the communications relate to future or present competitive
choices.'3 " For each of the resulting "four combinations of audience and tem-
poral focus," Page ascertains a tacit agreement based on whether the com-
munication at issue serves efficiency purposes.'38 For example, "[p]rivate
communications about future competitive choices . . . are most likely to
justify an inference of agreement," because they have "no credible effi-
ciency justification or purpose."'39 Page considers Foley the "paradigmatic"
example of this kind of communications.'4 According to Page, the court in
Foley "properly concluded that a jury could reasonably infer" a tacit agree-
ment because the communications at issue in Foley "conveyed no informa-
tion to consumers or other audiences because only competitors were
present."41 By contrast, "public communications about future prices ... are
130 Id. (citing Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 518 U.S. 231, 241 (1996)).
1'* Under this formulation, a tacit agreement is formed by conduct only, without any ex-
press communications. But parallel conduct has to be preceded by express communications in
order for there to be a tacit agreement.
132 See William H. Page, A Neo-Chicago Approach to Concerted Action, 78 ANTrRUST
L.J. 173, 184 (2012).
'3 Id.
134 Id.
"I Id. The insistence on verbalized communications here comports with the First Circuit's
approach to tacit agreement in White. See supra note 129 and accompanying text.
136 See Page, supra note 71, at 611-14. In particular, Page treats "implicit signals" as
communications, which he defines as "actions or words with general, often benign meanings
for more than one audience, but that also include information that conveys a special meaning
for rivals." Id. at 614.
11 Id. at 612.
38 See d. at 612-14 ("[T]acit agreement means interdependent actions coordinated by
prior communications of competitive intentions, in circumstances in which the communica-
tions do not provide any benefit to other audiences, especially consumers.").
13 9 Id. at 612, 615-16.
14 See id. at 612-14.
141 Id. at 615-16.
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usually thought to benefit consumers, and so are not a basis for inferring
tacit agreement . . ."142
Page's use of efficiency as the ultimate criterion for determining the
existence of a tacit agreement echoes the approach the Ninth Circuit took in
Petroleum Products, where the court held that the defendants' dissemination
of wholesale prices allowed an inference of an agreement to fix price be-
cause "the public dissemination of such information served little purpose
other than to facilitate interdependent or collusive price coordination." 43
The court noted, however, that public dissemination of retail prices would
not warrant an inference of conspiracy because such an inference "would
make it more difficult for retail consumers to get the information they need
to make efficient market decisions."'" Whether a practice serves efficiency
purposes, therefore, decides whether the practice constitutes an illegal
agreement.
As is the case with the minimalist approach and the expansive approach
to tacit agreement, the problem with the use of efficiency as the standard for
agreement is that it ignores the intent of the alleged conspirators. Under the
efficiency standard, defendants would not be considered to have agreed on
an illegal enterprise if their conduct happened to benefit third parties, even if
they intended to enter into a conspiracy. Conversely, defendants would be
considered to have entered into a conspiracy if their conduct happens to
confer no benefits on third parties, even if they have no demonstrable intent
to conspire. In other words, under the efficiency standard, whether the al-
leged conspirators have "agreed" depends on something that is completely
outside of their control.1 45
m. A KNOWLEDGE THEORY OF TACIT AGREEMENT
In light of the deficiencies of the existing approaches to tacit agree-
ment, this Article proposes a new approach that recognizes tacit agreement
as a possible means of reaching a Sherman Act agreement, and yet limits it
to instances where it can be demonstrated that the alleged conspirators have
constructive knowledge of one another's conspiratory intent. For the lack of
a better term, this Article refers to this approach as a "knowledge theory" of
tacit agreement. As will be elaborated below, this knowledge theory restores
142 Id. at 613.
113 In re Coordinated Pretrial Proceedings in Petroleum Products Antitrust Litigation, 906
F.2d 432, 448 (9th Cir. 1990).
'"Id. at 448 n.14.
14 Donald Turner foresaw the irrelevance of agreement to the determination of the exis-
tence of a Sherman Act agreement. In his seminal 1962 article, Turner argued that "con-
sciously interdependent decisions can be plausibly described either as 'agreement' or as
'individual action,' and there seems to be no adequate way of justifying the selection of either
description without going into aspects of the behavior that really have nothing to do with
agreement, or lack of agreement, as such." Turner, supra note 32, at 676.
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the central place of intent in ascertaining a Sherman Act agreement and pro-
vides a practical way of verifying that intent.
The knowledge theory of tacit agreement rejects the basic tenet of the
minimalist approach to tacit agreement. As discussed above, the minimalist
approach recognizes a Sherman Act agreement only when the agreement is
explicitly reached through verbalized communications."16 However, it is con-
ceivable that an agreement could be reached using verbalized communica-
tions that fall short of explicit assurances on a common course of actions,
but nonetheless convey the parties' intent to conspire with one another. The
scenario described by the Ninth Circuit in Esco, where each of the cocon-
spirators states their own plan to raise prices regardless of what others would
do, is a good example of such non-explicit verbalized communications.1 47
Furthermore, a tacit agreement could be formed by actions. As Donald Tur-
ner points out, "[i]t is not novel conspiracy doctrine to say that agreement
can be signified by action as well as by words."'4 There is no reason to
exclude an agreement from the reach of the Sherman Act simply because
"the circumstances make it possible to communicate without speech." 14 9 For
the sake of convenience, this Article uses the term "non-explicit communi-
cations" to refer to both non-explicit verbalized communications and
actions. The inclusion of actions within this broader category of communica-
tions is consistent with how communications are conceptualized in the eco-
nomic literature.150
Simply recognizing that non-explicit communications could form a
tacit agreement is a relatively easy task. The more difficult question is where
to draw the line between non-explicit communications that form a tacit
agreement and non-explicit communications that do not. As Phillip Areeda
and Herbert Hovenkamp point out, the difficult question "is how far may we
move away from direct, detailed, and reciprocal exchanges of assurances on
a common course of action and yet remain within the statutory and concep-
tual boundaries of an agreement.""'
See supra Part H.A.
1 See supra Part I.C. Exactly when such non-explicit verbalized communications give
rise to a tacit agreement is discussed above.
148 Turner, supra note 32, at 665.
149 Id. Turner's analysis focuses on the question of whether oligopolistic behavior consti-
tutes a tacit agreement. Id. ("[T]here is no reason to exclude oligopolistic behavior from the
scope of the term agreement . . ."). But the same logic applies to other instances where an
agreement is reached through non-explicit means.
150 See Dennis W. Carlton et al., Communications Among Competitors: Game Theory and
Antitrust, 5 GEO. MASON L. REv. 423, 431-36 (1997) (including actions within the scope of
communications).
1 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANrrrRusT LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTi-
TRUST PRINCLPLES AND THEIR APPiLICATION ¶ 1404 (2d ed. 2001). Similarly, Aaron Director
and Edward Levi acknowledge that "the serious problem of collusion is to determine what
conduct is to be characterized as the equivalent of an agreement . . ." Aaron Director &
Edward H. Levi, Law and the Future: Trade Regulation, 51 Nw. U. L. REv. 281, 295 (1956).
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This Article proposes that conspiratory intent be used as the yardstick
for distinguishing tacit agreements from uncoordinated actions. The Article
defines a tacit agreement as an agreement formed by non-explicit communi-
cations that enable coconspirators to acquire knowledge of one another's
conspiratory intent. This definition ensures the conceptual integrity of tacit
agreement by extracting the essence of an explicit agreement and applying it
to the tacit agreement setting. When coconspirators form an explicit agree-
ment, that is, when they exchange explicit assurances on a common course
of actions, they are conveying their conspiratory intent to one another
through explicit communications.1 52 If coconspirators choose to effectuate
their conspiracy through non-explicit means, they will need to convey their
conspiratory intent to one another through non-explicit communications or
actions. Tacit agreements differ from explicit ones with respect to the means
by which the agreements are reached, but not with respect to the coconspira-
tors' knowledge of one another's conspiratory intent.
Using conspiratory intent to ascertain the existence of a tacit agreement
also ensures that the agreement thus found remains within the statutory
boundaries of a Sherman Act agreement. This is so because the offense of
conspiracy is "predominantly mental.""s3 Under the common law, an essen-
tial element of conspiracy is a coconspirator's "intention on his part to asso-
ciate himself in the promotion of the [common] design." 54 An intent to
agree is among the intents that are required for the commission of a conspir-
acy.155 What makes a conspiracy unlawful is "not its actual or probable ef-
fects, but the common purpose to attain an objective covered by the law."S6
A definition of tacit agreement based on conspiratory intent invites crit-
icism from critics whose criterion for determining a Sherman Act agreement
is economic welfare. Judge Posner, the chief proponent of a welfare-based
definition of agreement under the Sherman Act, observes that "[t]he only
proof of price fixing that is required or ordinarily offered is proof that the
defendants conspired. The effects of the conspiracy are immaterial. It is thus
evident that what the law is actually punishing is the attempt to fix prices
and that the completed act-an actual restriction of output-is inciden-
tal."1 5 7 Judge Posner concludes that the emphasis on the fact of conspiring
152 An example of such explicit communications is when Party A approaches Party B and
says: "I will raise my price if you raise yours," and Party B replies: "Deal." Each party is
conveying to the other that he or she intends to enter into a conspiracy.
* See Rahl, supra note 1, at 752.
* Benjamin F. Pollack, Common Law Conspiracy, 35 GEO. L.J. 328, 332 (1947).
* See Richard R. Wirtz, Purpose and Effect in Sherman Act Conspiracies, 57 WASH. L.
REV. 1, 1 (1981).
156 Id. (internal citation omitted).
157 Richard A. Posner, A Program for the Antitrust Division, 38 U. CHI. L. REv. 500, 514
(1971).
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"is inconsistent with a program designed to maximize the net social product
of antitrust enforcement.""
While it might be desirable to use economic welfare as the "lodestar of
antitrust laws,"'5 9 it is possible that the welfare-maximization goal of an-
tirust can be accomplished without straining the meaning of the term agree-
ment. One way to accommodate both the conceptual and statutory confines
of the term agreement and the economic goals of antitrust is to define agree-
ment based on the strict legal meaning of the term, but then take into account
economic welfare when deciding whether the agreement thus found is un-
lawful. Under this approach, an agreement will be ascertained based on in-
tent-or what Judge Posner refers to as "attempt,"'60 but such agreement is
punishable under the Sherman Act only if it causes materially adverse
effects.16'
In principle, coconspirators' knowledge, at some level, of one another's
conspiratory intent is already part of what is required for a finding of a Sher-
man Act agreement. In Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Service Corp., the Su-
preme Court observes that "there must be direct or circumstantial evidence
that reasonably tends to prove that [the parties] had a conscious commit-
ment to a common scheme designed to achieve an unlawful objective."'62
The problem, however, is that current law offers no analytical guidance on
how to demonstrate such a conscious commitment outside of the explicit
agreement setting.1 63
This Article strives to supply an operational formula for how to ascer-
tain a tacit agreement. Under the knowledge theory proposed in this Article,
proof of conscious commitment to a common scheme is equated with proof
of coconspirators' knowledge of one another's conspiratory intent. Proof of
coconspirators' knowledge of one another's conspiratory intent does not con-
sist of proof of coconspirators' subjective state of mind. Instead, it consists
of proof of what a reasonable person would have known from the non-ex-
plicit communication in question. If the circumstances of the non-explicit
communication, including its content, timing, place, and manner, are of such
5s Id. (internal citation omitted). Posner further elaborates that "[m]any attempts to fix
price may have negligible consequences, while much serious price fixing may escape detection
altogether because proof of overt communication is normally required to establish an attempt
but such communication may not always be necessary to effectuate price fixing." Id. This view
is consistent with Posner's preference for "economic evidence" of collusion over evidence of
overt acts. See supra note 113.
15 Joshua D. Wright & Douglas H. Ginsburg, The Goals of Antitrust: Welfare Trumps
Choice, 81 FORDHAM L. REv. 2405, 2406 (2013).
"n See Posner, supra note 158 at 514.
'6' See Turner, supra note 32, at 663. Donald Turner suggests that there are two separate
questions when it comes to the legality of consciously parallel decisions: whether the con-
sciously parallel decisions constitute an "agreement," and whether the agreement should be
deemed unlawful. See id. This indicates that Turner is open to the idea of separating inquiries
into the effects of an agreement from the legal definition of agreement.
162 465 U.S. 752, 768 (1984).
' See William E. Kovacic, The Identification and Proof of Horizontal Agreements Under
the Antitrust Laws, 38 AwnrRusT BULL. 5, 25 (1993).
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a nature that a reasonable person would conclude that first, the communica-
tion is made to convey the sender's conspiratory intent, and second, the com-
munication has a reasonable likelihood of reaching the targeted recipient,
then the recipient of the communication would be considered to have con-
structive knowledge of the sender's conspiratory intent, irrespective of what
the recipient actually knows. 6 The degree of certainty with which the fact
finder will have to find these two elements to hold depends on the generally
applicable evidentiary standard, that is, beyond a reasonable doubt in crimi-
nal prosecutions and preponderance of the evidence in civil litigation.' 65
Of the two elements of proof of knowledge of conspiratory intent, proof
that the communication in question has a reasonable likelihood of reaching
its targeted recipient is relatively easy to establish. When defendants com-
municate in face-to-face meetings, it goes without saying that the communi-
cation reaches its targeted recipient.16 When defendants communicate by
actions that are observable by rivals, such as posting prices'' or publicly
announcing price changes in press releases,16 the communication has a rea-
sonable likelihood of reaching its targeted recipient given how closely rivals
monitor one another. However, if the communication takes place under cir-
cumstances where the alleged coconspirators are not reasonably expected to
receive it, the communication will not enable the alleged coconspirators to
acquire knowledge of the sender's conspiratory intent, even if that intent is
clear on the face of the communication.1 69
The other element of proof of knowledge of conspiratory intent-proof
that a non-explicit communication is made to convey conspiratory intent-is
more challenging to establish. Because of the non-explicit nature of the com-
" See Gregory Klass, Intent to Contract, 95 VA. L. REv. 1437, 1457 (2009). The author
states that this so-called "objective intent" is the "intent a reasonable person in the parties'
shared epistemic situation would attribute to her." Id.
16 Therefore, if a tacit agreement is the subject of a criminal prosecution, the instructions
to the jury will need to state that the jury has to conclude, beyond a reasonable doubt, that a
reasonable person would find the non-explicit communication in question to enable alleged
coconspirators to acquire knowledge of one another's conspiratory intent. By contrast, if a tacit
agreement is the subject of civil litigation, the jury will have to make that conclusion by a
preponderance of the evidence.
'" See United States v. Foley, 598 F.2d 1323 (4th Cir. 1979), supra notes 55-59 and
accompanying text for an example of such face-to-face communications, where defendant real
estate agents remarked on their plans to raise commissions at a dinner attended by other
defendants.
1" See White v. R.M. Packer Co., 635 F.3d 571, 574-75 (2011), in which defendant gaso-
line retailers on Martha's Vineyard were accused of fixing gasoline prices. The communication
at issue in that case was the public posting of gasoline prices by defendants. See id. at 577
(referring to "[a] geographically constrained gasoline market with publicly posted prices").
1" See In re Coordinated Pretrial Proceedings in Petroleum Products Antitrust Litigation,
906 F.2d 432, 445, 449 (9th Cir. 1990), in which the communication at issue was the public
announcement of price changes in press releases.
69 A hypothetical example is when a lumber distributor runs an advertisement announcing
its planned price change in a steel industry trade journal. The alleged coconspirators-fellow
lumber distributors-are not reasonably expected to read the steel industry trade journal.
Therefore, even though the advertisement is highly suspect, it will not reasonably allow the
alleged coconspirators to acquire knowledge of the advertiser's conspiratory intent.
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munications involved in tacit agreements, fact finders will need to decipher
actions or verbalized communications that may appear to be innocuous on
first blush. Fact finders will need to examine the potential business justifica-
tions for those actions or verbalized communications. If there are none, fact
finders shall be instructed by courts to conclude that the non-explicit com-
munication is made to signal the sender's conspiratory intent.170 In other
words, the non-explicit communication must be so odd that a reasonable
person would conclude that it is made to orchestrate a tacit agreement. The
oddity of the communication may stem from its content, timing, place, or
manner, with all being considered as a whole to determine the real purpose
of the communication.
Under this knowledge theory, whether the communication at issue has
efficiency justifications is still a relevant factor in two ways. First, the effi-
ciency, or the lack thereof, of the communication at issue goes toward estab-
lishing the alleged coconspirators' conspiratory intent. If a communication
has no efficiency justification, that is, if it confers no benefits on any third
parties, that strengthens the case that the communication is being used as a
sham to convey the sender's conspiratory intent."' Second, when and if the
communication at issue is found to orchestrate a tacit agreement, the effi-
ciency, or the lack thereof, of the communication at issue is an important
factor in deciding whether the agreement thus formed should be considered
unlawful.' 72 An agreement in and of itself does not violate the Sherman Act;
it violates the Sherman Act only when it causes competitive harms. 173
Because a tacit agreement under the Sherman Act requires a "meeting
of minds" between two parties,17 4 a tacit agreement could be found only if
each party to the alleged conspiracy has acquired knowledge of the other
"o As is the general rule, the plaintiff will shoulder the burden of proving that there are no
alternative explanations for the non-explicit communication other than conveying the sender's
conspiratory intent.
1' The assumption here is that when the communication benefits no one, the sender of the
communication would not have made the communication but for the purpose of signaling its
conspiratory intent to the recipient.
172 In this regard, courts should consider the efficiency of all actions or verbalized commu-
nications involved in the tacit agreement, not just the efficiency of any particular action or
verbalized communication. Under Foley, for example, courts should have evaluated not just
whether the remarks made by defendants at the dinner served efficiency purposes-that is,
whether consumers benefited from such remarks-but also whether the defendants' subsequent
conduct-the raising of real estate commissions-benefited consumers. For discussions of Fo-
ley, see supra notes 54-59 and accompanying text.
" This should not be taken as a proposal to subject all tacit agreements to the rule of
reason, which "requires the plaintiff to plead and prove that defendants with market power
have engaged in anticompetitive conduct." Herbert J. Hovenkamp, The Rule of Reason, 70
FLORIDA L. REv. 81, 83 (2018). Under antitrust law, agreements are considered per se illegal
when their effects are determined to be so pernicious that elaborate inquiries into the precise
harm they cause or their business excuses are not necessary. See Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v.
United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958). If certain tacit agreements are determined to have similar
pernicious effects, they can be made subject to the per se rule, but that is after their competi-
tive harms have been evaluated.
1' Am. Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 810 (1946).
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party's conspiratory intent. In the paradigmatic scenario where one party ini-
tiates a communication and the other party responds to that communication,
a tacit agreement could be analogized to a contract formed by a tacit offer
and followed by a tacit acceptance.175 Using a case study, the discussions
below illustrate how the knowledge theory would ascertain such tacit offers
and tacit acceptances.
A. Tacit Offer
When an alleged coconspirator initiates a non-explicit communication
to other alleged coconspirators, the communication constitutes a tacit offer
of conspiracy if it allows the recipients of the communication to acquire
knowledge of the sender's conspiratory intent. One example of such non-
explicit communication that could potentially be a tacit offer of a conspiracy
comes from Bill Page, in his work on tacit agreement, describing a German
auction of ten blocks of spectrum. 176 Under the rules of the auction, all bids
submitted after each round are made public to all bidders.'77 The rules also
require each new bid to be at least ten percent higher than the previous
bid. 178 Firm A initially bids DM twenty million on blocks 1-5 and DM 18.18
million on blocks 6-10.'7 Firm B then bids DM twenty million on blocks
6-10 and does not bid on blocks 1-5.1so There are no further bids."8 ' As a
result, Firm A wins blocks 1-5 and Firm B wins blocks 6-10.
Are the initial bids by Firm A a tacit offer of a conspiracy? In other
words, is Firm A trying to signal to Firm B that it should bid DM twenty
million on blocks 6-10 and let Firm A have blocks 1-5? The reason why
Firm A's bids are suspicious is because of the "oddly specific" number of
18.18.182 The number 18.18 makes no sense until one adds ten percent to it
and obtains 19.998.183 So if Firm B bids DM twenty million on blocks 6-10,
that would satisfy the requirement that a new bid be ten percent higher than
the previous bid. That fact, along with the fact that Firm A bids DM twenty
million on blocks 1-5, indicates that Firm A might be proposing to Firm B
that each bids DM twenty million on the blocks of their choice, blocks 1-5
for Firm A and blocks 6-10 for Firm B. Seen in this light, Firm A's initial
" Judge Posner first used this contract analogy to explain his view of interdependent
conduct: "If a firm raises price in the expectation that its competitors will do likewise, and
they do, the firm's behavior can be conceptualized as the offer of a unilateral contract that the
offerees accept by raising their prices." In re High Fructose Corn Syrup Antitrust Litig., 295
F.3d 651, 654 (7th Cir. 2002).
16 See Page, Tacit Agreement, supra note 71, at 628 n. 158.
1' See Martin Bichler et al., Bargaining in Spectrum Auctions: A Review of the German
Auction in 2015, 41 ThLEcoMMUNICATIONs POL'Y 325, 325-26 (2017).
178 See Page, supra note 71, at 628 n.158.
179 See id.
180 See id.
181 See id.
182 See id.
" See id.
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bids could be a tacit offer of a conspiracy to allocate blocks 1-5 to Firm A
and blocks 6-10 to Firm B, at DM twenty million each.
Under the knowledge theory, whether Firm A's bids are a tacit offer of
conspiracy will depend on whether a reasonable person would perceive them
as an attempt to convey Firm A's conspiratory intent. That, in turn, will de-
pend on whether there are alternative explanations for Firm A's bids. Be-
cause of the unique relationship between the numbers 18.18 and twenty in
light of the auction rule requiring a new bid to be at least ten percent higher
than the previous bid, fact finders are likely to conclude that a reasonable
person would agree that Firm A's bids were chosen to signal Firm A's con-
spiratory intent. Firm A could offer affirmative defenses by presenting evi-
dence that there are other legitimate reasons for its bids. If it does, it has the
burden of proving such affirmative defenses in accordance with the general
burden-of-proof rules.lu
B. Tacit Acceptance
A tacit offer of conspiracy needs to be accepted by the offeree in order
for there to be a tacit agreement. Because of the non-explicit nature of a tacit
agreement, the offeree's acceptance, by definition, takes the form of an ac-
tion or verbalized communication that falls short of an explicit expression of
assurance. The question, however, is how to determine whether a non-ex-
plicit communication is a tacit acceptance.
Under the knowledge theory, a non-explicit communication from the
offeree is a tacit acceptance of the conspiracy offer if it enables the offeror to
acquire knowledge of the offeree's conspiratory intent. Simply committing
an action that is invited by the tacit offer does not necessarily constitute a
tacit acceptance, because the offeror would not know whether the action is
being committed in acceptance of its tacit offer or for other legitimate rea-
sons.8 5 For a non-explicit communication to be a tacit acceptance, the of-
feror of the conspiracy would have to know that there are no other reasons
for the offeree's non-explicit communication. Only when the offeror knows
that the offeree is responding to its tacit offer can it be said that the offeror
and the offeree have a "meeting of the minds."
Continuing with the example of the German spectrum auction, when
Firm B does what Firm A invites it to do-that is, bid DM twenty million on
blocks 6-10 and not bid on blocks 1-5-that fact alone does not make Firm
B's bids a tacit acceptance of Firm A's tacit offer. Firm B could be bidding
'" See John Calvin Jeffries, Jr. & Paul B. Stephen III, Defenses, Presumptions, and Bur-
den of Proof in the Criminal Law, 88 YALE L.J. 1325, 1334-35 (1979); Bruce L. Hay &
Kathryn E. Spier, Burdens of Proof in Civil Litigation: An Economic Perspective, 26 J. LEGAL
STUD. 413, 427-28 (1997).
is5 This is the case because, when committing the action, the offeree does not make an
explicit statement about why the action is being committed, again because of the non-explicit
nature of the alleged agreement.
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that way for reasons that have nothing to do with Firm A's tacit offer. Just
because Firm B does what Firm A asks it to do does not mean that Firm B is
accepting Firm A's conspiracy offer.1 86 Firm B could be bidding DM twenty
million on blocks 6-10 but not on blocks 1-5 because it has only DM twenty
million to spend on the spectrums.187 Alternatively, Firm B may have funds
to bid on all ten blocks, but its business needs only justify bidding on five
blocks. Fact finders need to rule out these alternative reasons for Firm B's
bids before concluding that Firm B is accepting Firm A's tacit acceptance
through its bids.
Not only can there be no alternative reasons for Firm B's bids, but the
fact that there are no alternative reasons for Firm B's bids must be known to
a reasonable person in Firm A's situation in order for Firm B's bids to be
considered a tacit acceptance of Firm A's tacit offer. The knowledge theory
requires each party to the alleged conspiracy to have constructive knowledge
of each other's conspiratory intent. For Firm A to have constructive knowl-
edge of Firm B's conspiratory intent, a reasonable person in Firm A's situa-
tion would have to know that Firm B has enough funds to bid on all ten
blocks, and that its business needs justify bidding on all ten blocks.'" The
key here is to show that a reasonable person would know that Firm B would
not have bid the way it did but for Firm A's tacit offer.
IV. APPLYING THE KNOWLEDGE THEORY
The knowledge theory set forth in the previous section provides a uni-
fied logic for the law on tacit agreement. Under the knowledge theory, what
distinguishes concerted from unconcerted actions in the tacit agreement set-
ting is whether the non-explicit communication at issue would enable the
parties to the alleged agreement to have knowledge of one another's con-
spiratory intent. The knowledge theory further operationalizes this logic by
investigating whether the circumstances of the non-explicit communication
at issue are such that a reasonable person would conclude that it is sent to
convey conspiratory intent. This logic is clear, yet flexible. It could be ap-
plied to vastly different factual scenarios without compromising the consis-
tency of the rule.
This Part reconsiders the current case law on tacit agreement from the
perspective of the knowledge theory. It applies the knowledge theory to four
" This point can be illustrated by a somewhat extreme example. When A tells B: "If you
would like to accept my offer of conspiracy, come and walk your dog at the park tomorrow
7:00 AM." If B walks his dog at the park at 7:00 AM every day, walking his dog at the park at
7:00 AM the next day does not mean that B accepted A's conspiracy offer.
'11 Given Firm A's bids, bidding DM twenty million on blocks 6-10 and not bidding on
blocks 1-5 would be the best strategy for Firm B, even if Firm B has no intent to accept Firm
A's conspiracy offer.
"' This evidentiary requirement is high, but not insurmountable. Evidence could come
from past interactions between Firm A and Firm B, or from publicly available financial data
and business plans.
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factual scenarios where courts have opined on whether tacit agreements
could arise: conscious parallelism, parallel conduct preceded by suggestive
communications, hub-and-spoke conspiracy, and facilitating practices. The
current treatment by courts and scholars of whether and how tacit agreement
could arise in those factual scenarios is incoherent at best.189 As described
below, applying the knowledge theory to those factual scenarios leads to
outcomes that are largely, but not entirely, consistent with current case law.
The rationales for the outcomes, however, are drastically different under the
knowledge theory compared with current case law, to the extent that current
case law articulates its rationales at all. The applications below also reveal
the weaknesses of the current case law for some of those factual scenarios.
A. Conscious Parallelism
The judicial attitude toward "conscious parallelism," defined as "a
common reaction of 'firms in a concentrated market that recognize their
shared economic interests and their interdependence with respect to price
and output decisions,' "19 has been very permissive.191 Recall that in Theatre
Enterprises, Inc., the Supreme Court stated that it had "never held that proof
of parallel business behavior conclusively establishes agreement or, phrased
differently, that such behavior itself constitutes a Sherman Act offense." 92
In White, the First Circuit held that "[the d]efendants' assertion that 'a
merely tacit agreement is not an antitrust violation' conflates the concepts of
'tacit collusion,' referring to bare conscious parallelism, and 'tacit agree-
ment,' which can be reached under Section 1 . . ."193 Most recently, in
Twombly, the Supreme Court reiterated that "conscious parallelism" is "not
in itself unlawful." 94
The most decisive argument for not treating conscious parallelism as a
Sherman Act agreement, put forward by Donald Turner, and widely accepted
today, is that it is very difficult, if not impossible, to fashion a remedy for
conscious parallelism.'95 Turner argues that an injunction prohibiting a de-
fendant from taking into account the probable price decisions of his competi-
tors in determining his own price or output would "demand such irrational
behavior that full compliance would be virtually impossible."1 96 Turner adds
that the only injunction that would be effective against oligopoly pricing is
one that requires an oligopolist to lower its price to the point where it equals
`9 See supra Parts I.B-I.C.
" Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 553 (2007).
' See AREEDA & [-OVENKAMP, supra note 152, at ¶ 1433a ("The courts are nearly unani-
mous in saying that mere interdependent parallelism does not establish the contract, combina-
tion, or conspiracy required by the Sherman Act § 1.").
'9 Theatre Enter., Inc. v. Paramount Film Distrib. Corp., 346 U.S. 537, 541 (1954).
19 White v. R.M. Packer Co., 635 F.3d 571, 576 n.3 (1st Cir. 2011).635 F.3d at 576 n.3.
'9 See 550 U.S. at 553-54.
195 See Turner, supra note 32, at 669.
9 Id.
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marginal cost, but that would turn courts into a public utility type of regula-
tor. 9 7 A last resort would be the "dissolution or divestiture of the dominant
firms.""9 "But to fall back on this remedy is virtually to concede that ... it
was the structural situation, not the behavior of the industry members, which
was fundamentally responsible for the unsatisfactory results."'9
Turner's argument on the difficulty of providing a remedy for conscious
parallelism addresses the question of whether it is possible, or desirable, to
make conscious parallelism an unlawful agreement. It does not address,
however, the threshold question of whether conscious parallelism should be
considered an agreement to begin with. The answer to the latter question has
to come from inquiries into whether there is "a unity of purpose or a com-
mon design and understanding, or a meeting of the minds in an unlawful
arrangement." 200
Do the alleged coconspirators in conscious parallelism reach a meeting
of the minds? As Turner points out, in conscious parallelism, oligopolists are
simply anticipating "what the consequences of [their] price decision would
be, taking into account the probable or virtually certain reactions of [their]
competitors."2 0 1 This behavior, according to Turner, "can be described as
individual behavior-rational individual decision in the light of relevant ec-
onomic facts-as well as it can be described as 'agreement.' "202 Other schol-
ars have similarly expressed doubts about whether conscious parallelism
amounts to a conscious commitment to a common scheme, though they have
not been able to articulate the reasons why. 20 3
The knowledge theory provides a much-needed framework for analyz-
ing whether conscious parallelism constitutes a tacit agreement under the
Sherman Act. Under the knowledge theory, what matters is whether a rea-
sonable person would conclude that the communication alleged to form a
tacit agreement-oligopolistic pricing--enables oligopolists to have knowl-
edge of one another's conspiratory intent. Since oligopolistic pricing occurs
during the ordinary course of the oligopolists' business, it does not send ri-
vals a definitive signal about the sender's conspiratory intent. The reasons for
this observation are twofold. First, price increases during the ordinary course
of a firm's business are not exclusively intended for the firm's rivals; they are
" See id. at 670.
'
9 8 Id. at 671.
' Id.
2" Am. Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 810 (1946).
201 Turner, supra note 32, at 661.
202 Id. at 666.
203 See, e.g., Hay, supra note 24, at 894 ("[I]f there is to be substance to the concept of a
tacit agreement, it must be defined in such a way that it does not extend to supra-competitive
pricing arising purely from oligopolistic interdependence."); Director & Levi, supra note 152,
at 296 ("It would appear to be extremely difficult and unwise for the law to assume that action
taken on general knowledge implies a concert of action equivalent to collusion, conspiracy or
agreement . . .").
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also intended for the firm's customers. 20 4 Without being able to tell whether
the pricing information is intended for them, rivals would not be able to
know that the sender of the information wants to conspire. Second, in post-
ing supracompetitive price increases, oligopolists could be responding to
changes in market conditions, such as changes in market demand or costs. 20 5
Because there is nothing odd about changing prices from a business point of
view, a reasonable person would not conclude that the real purpose of price
changes is to signal an offer or acceptance of a conspiracy. 206
While current case law does not treat conscious parallelism alone as
agreement, it makes clear that parallel conduct could potentially violate the
Sherman Act when it is coupled with certain "plus factors," 2 07 or factors that
"tend[ ] to exclude the possibility that the alleged conspirators acted inde-
pendently."2 08 Courts have identified a number of such plus factors, such as
evidence of inter-firm communications, 209 proof that the parallel conduct is
contrary to each defendant's apparent self-interest, 210 proof of defendants'
motives for entering into the alleged conspiracy, 211 artificial standardization
204 It may not be entirely clear whether the primary target of an oligopolist's pricing infor-
mation is its rivals or customers. See Joseph Kattan, Beyond Facilitating Practices: Price Sig-
naling and Price Protection Clauses in the New Antitrust Environment, 63 ANTTRUST L.J.
133, 138-39 (1994) ("The price announcements were an efficient means of notifying custom-
ers of price changes and did not contain any element that could be viewed predominantly as a
signal to competitors rather than as a notice to customers.").
205 See id. at 138 (discussing difficulties in distinguishing the situation in which an oligo-
polist initiates a higher price because of higher costs from the situation in which an oligopolist
initiates a higher price in the hope that its rivals would follow).
20 Evaluating whether conscious parallelism is an agreement based on how oligopolists
communicate with one another may be troublesome to scholars who prefer using the economic
effects of oligopolistic pricing as the evaluation standard. See, e.g., Louis Kaplow, On the
Meaning of Horizontal Agreements in Competition Law, 99 CALW. L. Rev. 683, 697-99
(2011) (arguing that the core of the agreement requirement under the Sherman Act is interde-
pendent behavior, not various mechanisms for achieving it, like communications). Kaplow's
approach, however, promotes economic efficiency at the expense of the integrity of the term
agreement. See generally id.
207 C-O-Two Fire Equip. Co. v. United States, 197 F.2d 489, 493 (9th Cir. 1952).
' Matsushita Electrical Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 588 (1986) (in-
ternal citation omitted).
2I See, e.g., In re Plywood Antitrust Litig., 655 F.2d 627, 633-34 (5th Cir. 1981); Gaines-
ville Util. Dep't v. Fla. Power & Light Co., 573 F.2d 292, 301 (5th Cir.1978).
210 See, e.g., Milgram v. Loew's, Inc., 192 F.2d 579, 583 (3d Cir. 1951) (conduct in "ap-
parent contradiction to [each defendant's] own self-interest . . . strengthens considerably the
inference of conspiracy"); Independent Iron Works, Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 322 F.2d
656, 661 (9th Cir. 1963) (holding that the inference of conspiracy from parallel business be-
havior "might have been permissible in the absence of evidence showing that [defendants']
respective actions were prompted by some fact other than mutual understanding or agree-
ment."). Numerous decisions have held that the inference of conspiracy from parallel conduct
is permissible "where the pattern of action undertaken is inconsistent with the self-interest of
the individual actors, were they acting alone." Admiral Theatre Corp. v. Douglas Theatre Co.,
585 F.2d 877, 884 (8th Cir. 1978); accord Proctor v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 675 F.2d
308, 327 (D.C. Cir. 1982); Pan-Islamic Trade Corp. v. Exxon Corp., 632 F.2d 539, 559 (5th
Cir. 1980); Modem Home Inst., Inc. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 513 F.2d 102, 111
(2d Cir. 1975).
211 See, e.g., First Nat'l Bank of Ariz. v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253, 287 (1968);
Bogosian v. Gulf Oil Corp., 561 F.2d 434, 446 (3d Cir. 1977); Michelman v. Clark-Schwebel
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of products, 2 12 and price increases during times of low demand. 2 13 Econo-
mists and legal scholars have also proposed their own plus factors. Judge
Posner, for instance, has identified a number of market conditions that are
favorable to collusion 2 14 as well as a number of types of economic evidence
that indicate the actual existence of collusion. 2 15 William Kovacic et al. pro-
posed a number of "super plus factors" that they believed possess the
strongest probative value in indicating the presence of explicit collusion. 216
Admittedly, some of the plus factors identified by courts and scholars
go toward establishing explicit agreements, like evidence of inter-firm com-
munications. Other plus factors do not differentiate between explicit and
tacit agreements. 2 17 To the extent that they are used to strengthen the case for
a tacit agreement, the plus factors, as they are formulated under current case
law, do not address the question of whether there is a meeting of the minds
in the alleged tacit agreement. 218 Even if they did, current case law does not
provide a satisfactory way to differentiate among the plus factors in terms of
their probative value.2 19
The knowledge theory proposed in this Article provides an analytical
framework for assessing the probative value of the plus factors in proving
tacit agreements. Under the knowledge theory, whether a plus factor bolsters
inferences of a tacit agreement would depend on whether, in light of the plus
Fiber Glass Corp., 534 F.2d 1036, 1049 (2d Cir. 1976); Venzie Corp. v. United States Mineral
Prods. Co., 521 F.2d 1309, 1314 (3d Cir. 1975); Overseas Motors, Inc. v. Import Motors Ltd.,
375 F. Supp. 499, 532 (E.D. Mich. 1974), affd, 519 F.2d 119 (6th Cir. 1975).
212 See C-O-Two Fire Equip. Co. v. United States, 197 F.2d 489, 497 (9th Cir. 1952).
213 See Am. Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 805 (1946); C-O-Two Fire Equip.
Co., 197 F.2d at 497.
214 These conditions are: market concentration on the selling side, no fringe of small sell-
ers, inelastic demand at competitive price, market entry taking a long time, unconcentrated
buying side, standard product, nondurable product, the principal firms selling at the same level
in the chain of distribution, price competition being more important than other forms of com-
petition, high ratio of fixed to variable costs, similar cost structures and production processes,
declining over time or static demand, prices' ability to change quickly, sealed bidding, locality
of market, cooperative practices, and the industry's antitrust record. See POSNER, supra note
108, at 69-79.
215 These types of economic evidence are: fixed relative market shares, marketwide price
discrimination, exchanges of price information, regional price variations, identical bids, price,
output, and capacity changes at the formation of the cartel, industrywide resale price mainte-
nance, declining market share of leaders, amplitude and fluctuation of price changes, demand
elastic at the market price, level and pattern of profits, and market price inversely correlated
with number of firms or elasticity of demand, basing-point pricing, and exclusionary practices.
See POSNER, supra note 108, at 79-93.
216 See William E. Kovacic et al., Plus Factors and Agreement in Antitrust Law, 110
MicH. L. REv. 393, 413-26 (2011).
217 The plus factors only establish that the defendants are more likely than not to have
reached an agreement, either explicitly or implicitly.
218 This is because, under current case law, whether plus factors suggest an agreement is
"not so much whether a 'meeting of the minds' in the common-law contract sense existed as
whether these are types of behavior that the law should suppress." Herbert J. Hovenkamp, The
Pleading Problem in Antitrust Cases and Beyond, IOWA L. Rev. 55, 62 (2010).
219 See Kovacic et al., supra note 216, at 396 ("[T]here is persistent dissatisfaction with
the analytical methods commonly used in antitrust enforcement and litigation to distinguish
plus factors in terms of their probative value.").
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factor, the parallel conduct allows the alleged coconspirators to have con-
structive knowledge of one another's conspiratory intent. The plus factor,
considered along with the parallel conduct at issue, must be of such a nature
that a reasonable person would conclude that the parallel conduct itself con-
veys the alleged coconspirators' intent to offer or accept a conspiracy. The
application of the knowledge theory to plus factors can be illustrated using
two plus factors as case studies: proof that the parallel conduct is contrary to
each defendant's self-interest, and proof of defendants' motives for entering
into the alleged conspiracy.
"Proof that the parallel [conduct is] contrary to each [defendant's] ap-
parent self-interest" is "the most consistently used" plus factor for proving
an agreement. 220 In considering this plus factor, courts generally require evi-
dence that "the pattern of action undertaken is inconsistent with the self-
interest of the individual actors, were they acting alone." 221 Actions inconsis-
tent with self-interest strike outside observers as odd, satisfying the basic
requirement of the knowledge theory. However, in order for this plus factor
to have probative value in proving a tacit agreement, not only should the
parallel conduct be inconsistent with the defendants' self-interest, but the
fact that the parallel conduct is inconsistent with the defendants' self-interest
must be known to the defendants. Without knowing that the parallel conduct
is inconsistent with the defendants' self-interest, a reasonable person would
not suspect that the real purpose of the parallel conduct is something else,
that is, to signal an offer or acceptance of a conspiracy.
By contrast, proof of defendants' motives for entering into the alleged
conspiracy offers no probative value for proving a tacit agreement. 222 This
plus factor could be said to be the mirror image of the conduct-against-self-
interest plus factor, as the latter indicates that the defendants have no mo-
tives for entering into the alleged conspiracy. While conduct inconsistent
with self-interest puts outside observers on notice that something suspicious
might be the real reason for the conduct, conduct consistent with self-interest
does not. It is completely normal for defendants to carry out actions for
which they have motives. As a result, a reasonable person would not con-
clude that such actions signal conspiratory intent.
220 Michael K. Vaska, Comment, Conscious Parallelism and Price Fixing: Defining the
Boundary, 52 U. CHi. L. REv. 508, 520 (1985).
221 Admiral Theatre Corp. v. Douglas Theatre Co., 585 F.2d 877, 884 (8th Cir. 1978). See
also Proctor v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 675 F.2d 308, 327 (D.C. Cir. 1982); Modem
Home Inst., Inc. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 513 F.2d 102, 111 (2d Cir. 1975).
222 For discussions of the use of this plus factor, see Venzie Corp. v. U.S. Mineral Products
Co., Inc., 521 F.2d 1309, 1313-14 (3d Cir. 1975); In re Japanese Electronic Products Antitrust
Litig., 723 F.2d 238, 313 (3d Cir. 1983), cert. granted sub nom., Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v.
Zenith Radio Corp., 471 U.S. 1002 (1985).
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B. Parallel Conduct Preceded by Suggestive Communications
The knowledge theory can shed light on whether parallel conduct pre-
ceded by suggestive communications, exemplified by the factual scenario in
Foley, constitutes a tacit agreement. In Foley, each of the defendant real
estate agents made comments at a dinner that he or she would raise commis-
sions regardless of what others would do. 223 The defendants raised commis-
sions from six percent to seven percent following the dinner.224 The Fourth
Circuit found "ample evidence to permit the finding of a conspiracy involv-
ing each of the defendants." 225 However, the court did not elaborate on the
reason for its finding beyond emphasizing that the defendants appeared to
believe that they had an agreement and that they attempted to enforce the
agreement.226
The knowledge theory provides an analytical framework to assess
whether the suggestive communications at the dinner constitute a tacit offer
of conspiracy and whether the parallel conduct following the dinner consti-
tutes a tacit acceptance of conspiracy. Regarding the question of tacit offer,
the defendants who attended the dinner did preface their remarks with state-
ments that they did not care what others would do. But a non-explicit com-
munication can convey a sender's conspiratory intent even if the sender
explicitly denies an intent to conspire. Whether a sender indeed communi-
cates a tacit offer to conspire depends on the totality of circumstances sur-
rounding the sender's non-explicit communications. In Foley, the defendants
were aware that discussions of a rate increase agreement at the dinner could
lead to antitrust investigations. 227 So given the sensitive nature of the issue,
when the defendants said they would raise rates regardless of what others
would do, they could have been hinting that others should understand them
to mean the opposite, that is, they were really inviting others to follow suit.
If the prosecution could present enough evidence to convince the jury that
this was the case beyond a reasonable doubt, the remarks made by the de-
fendants at the dinner could be considered to have been a tacit offer of
conspiracy.
Regarding the question of tacit acceptance, one has to examine whether
the parallel conduct following the dinner-the rate increase from six percent
to seven percent-enabled the defendants to acquire knowledge of one an-
223 See United States v. Foley, 598 F.2d 1323, 1332 (4th Cir. 1979).
2 24 See id. at 1327.2 25 Id. at 1331.
226 See generally id. at 1332. The court outlined evidence of each defendant's attempts to
enforce the alleged agreement. See id. For example, the court stated that the lead defendant,
John P. Foley, Jr., called another real estate firm that had accepted some listings at the six-
percent rate and told that firm that the six-percent listings were a mistake "because if they all
did not hold the line none of them could get seven percent." Id.
227 The vice president of one of the defendant firms stated at the dinner "that they should
not be discussing a rate increase and said that his firm was always the first to be investigated
when something like this happened as it was the county's largest." Id. at 1333-34.
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other's conspiratory intent. In making this determination, one has to inquire
whether there were alternative explanations for the rate increases. If the de-
fendants would have increased their rates from six percent to seven percent
anyway, just because they increased their rates following the dinner does not
mean that they accepted the tacit offer made at the dinner. But if the defend-
ants would not have raised their rates had there not been a tacit offer, and if
that fact was known to all defendants, then the fact that they raised their
rates allowed the defendants to know one another's conspiratory intent.
The factual evidence presented in Foley appears to support the conclu-
sion that the rate increases following the dinner constituted a tacit accept-
ance of the tacit offer of conspiracy. In concluding that the evidence
presented permitted a finding of conspiracy, the court in Foley emphasized
that "the discussion [at the dinner] also included reference to the earlier
unsuccessful effort by [one defendant] to adopt a seven percent policy
... "228 Because all defendants were aware that unilateral efforts to raise rates
would be unsuccessful, they would not expect other defendants to raise rates
again if they were not responding to the tacit offer of conspiracy made at the
dinner. Thus, the fact that the defendants did raise rates following the dinner
sent a signal to one another that they were accepting the offer of conspiracy.
C. Hub-and-Spoke Conspiracy
In a hub-and-spoke conspiracy, a "hub" organizes a horizontal agree-
ment "among upstream or downstream firms" known as the "spokes"
through a series of separate vertical agreements.2 9 Plaintiffs must allege
enough evidence indicating that a horizontal agreement exists among the
spokes in order for the hub-and-spoke conspiracy to be subject to the per se
rule that usually applies to horizontal agreements. 23 0
The crucial question, then, is how to infer a horizontal agreement
among the spokes from separate sets of vertical agreements between the hub
and the spokes. In many cases, courts have made inferences and held that a
horizontal agreement existed among the spokes without evidence of an ex-
plicit agreement. 231 However, courts have failed to provide a consistent ratio-
nale for these findings.
228 Id. at 1332.
229 See Orbach, supra note 70, at 1.
230 This is the so-called "rim requirement." See id. at 3-4. Plaintiffs have attempted to
allege "rimless wheel" conspiracies, ones "in which various defendants enter into separate
agreements with a common defendant, but where the defendants have no connection with one
another, other than the common defendant's involvement in each transaction." Dickson v.
Microsoft Corp., 309 F.3d 193, 203 (4th Cir. 2002). But courts have rejected such arguments,
holding that allegations of a single "rimless wheel" conspiracy do not assert a viable conspir-
acy under the Sherman Act. See id. at 203-04.
231 See, e.g., Interstate Circuit v. United States, 306 U.S. 208 (1939); United States v.
Masonite Corp., 316 U.S. 265 (1942); Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207
(1959); United States v. Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U.S. 29 (1960); United States v. General
Motors Corp., 384 U.S. 127 (1966); Toys "R" Us, Inc. v. Fed. Trade Comm'n, 221 F.3d 928
4332019]
Harvard Business Law Review
The knowledge theory could be applied in cases involving allegations
of hub-and-spoke conspiracies. To determine whether there is a horizontal
agreement among the spokes, one must inquire whether the communications
between the hub and the spokes constitute a tacit offer of conspiracy made
by the spokes. One must also inquire whether the parallel adoptions by the
spokes of a vertical agreement with the hub constitute a tacit acceptance of
the tacit offer of conspiracy. The application of the knowledge theory to the
hub-and-spoke conspiracy can be illustrated using two well-known hub-and-
spoke cases: Interstate Circuit and Toys "R" Us.
In Interstate Circuit, the defendant first-run movie theater groups (the
hub) sent letters to the defendant motion picture distributors (the spokes)
demanding restrictions on licenses for subsequent-run theaters.23 2 The letters
named all of the defendants as addressees.233 Therefore, each defendant
knew that the same demands were made of other defendants. The Court
equated the defendants' knowledge with knowledge that "concerted action
was contemplated and invited." 23 4 This was correct, but the concerted action
there was contemplated and invited by the hub, not by the spokes. To prove a
tacit agreement among the spokes, the tacit offer has to come from the
spokes, not from the hub. It is not entirely clear, therefore, that the knowl-
edge theory would treat the hub's letters to the spokes as tacit offers from the
spokes.
In contrast, the communications between the hub and the spokes in Toys
"R" Us more clearly demonstrate tacit offers from the spokes. In that case,
the Fourth Circuit upheld the Federal Trade Commission's (FTC) finding that
Toys "R" Us "had acted as the coordinator of a horizontal agreement among
a number of toy manufacturers" through "a network of vertical agree-
ments." 235 Evidence indicated that, during negotiations for the vertical agree-
ments between Toys "R" Us and the manufacturers, Toys "R" Us
communicated to the manufacturers that each one of them would be willing
to restrict sales to independent warehouse clubs if other manufacturers
would do the same.236 These communications conveyed the spokes' con-
spiratory intent to one another.
Where the communications between the hub and the spokes constitute a
tacit offer, the next question is whether the spokes accepted the tacit offer by
(7th Cir. 2000); Dickson v. Microsoft Corp., 309 F.3d 193 (4th Cir. 2002); United States v.
Apple, Inc., 791 F.3d 290 (2d Cir. 2015); In re Musical Instruments and Equip. Antitrust
Litig., 798 F.3d 1186 (9th Cir. 2015).
232 See Interstate Circuit, 306 U.S. at 216-17.
233 See id. at 216.
234 Id. at 226.
" Toys "R" Us, Inc., 221 F.3d at 930. In each of the vertical agreements, "the manufac-
turer promised to restrict the distribution of its products to low-priced warehouse club stores,
on the condition that other manufacturers would do the same." Id.
236 Id. at 932. An executive of Toys "R" Us testified that "[wle communicated to our
vendors that we were communicating with all our key suppliers, and we did that I believe at
Toy Fair 1992. We made a point to tell each of the vendors that we spoke to that we would be
talking to our other key suppliers." Id.
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adopting the vertical agreements. Again, the general standard under the
knowledge theory applies: one must inquire whether there are explanations
for the parallel adoptions other than responses to the tacit offer. In Interstate
Circuit, the Court noted that the acceptance by all of the spokes of the hub's
demand to increase minimum later-run ticket prices to twenty-five cents was
"a radical departure from the previous business practices of the industry."2 7
But that did not, in and of itself, mean that there were no legitimate business
justifications for the business practice change.238 The Court in Interstate Cir-
cuit avoided inquiries into the business justifications for the spokes' parallel
acceptances of the hub's demand because it inferred an explicit agreement
from the circumstances of the case.239 But if the Court had been called upon
to determine whether the demand letters and the parallel acceptances them-
selves constituted a tacit agreement, it would have had to investigate
whether the spokes would not have adopted the policy demanded by the hub
had they not received the letter. In accordance with the knowledge theory,
the Court would also have had to investigate whether the fact that the spokes
would not have adopted the policy demanded by the hub but for the demand
letters was known to the spokes.
The Seventh Circuit in Toys "R" Us did evaluate whether there were
business justifications for the spokes' acceptances of the hub's demands. The
court concluded that Toys "R" Us presented a more compelling case for in-
ferring a tacit agreement than Interstate Circuit, because "not only was the
manufacturers' decision to stop dealing with the warehouse clubs an abrupt
shift from the past, and not only is it suspicious for a manufacturer to de-
prive itself of a profitable sales outlet, but the record here included the direct
evidence of communications that was missing in Interstate Circuit."2a
Under the knowledge theory, the significance of the communications in Toys
"R" Us is that they allowed the spokes to directly know one another's con-
spiratory intent, obviating the need for the spokes to convey their con-
spiratory intent through conduct.
D. Facilitating Practices
The knowledge theory also provides guidance on when facilitating
practices allow inferences of a tacit agreement on underlying parallel con-
duct. Firms employ many "facilitating practices... [including] systems for
reporting transaction prices, most-favored customer clauses, meeting compe-
tition clauses, delivered or basing point pricing, industry-wide resale price
237 Interstate Circuit v. United States, 306 U.S. 208, 222 (1939).
238 See generally id. at 224-25.
239 See id. at 225 ("In the face of this action and similar unanimity with respect to other
features of the proposals, and the strong motive for such unanimity of action, we decline to
speculate whether there may have been other and more legitimate reasons for such action not
disclosed by the record, but which, if they existed, were known to appellants.").
240 Toys "R" Us, Inc. v. Fed. Trade Comm'n, 221 F.3d 928, 935 (7th Cir. 2000).
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maintenance, and public price announcements."2 41 Under current case law,
these facilitating practices are not necessarily sufficient to constitute a plus
factor that would raise a jury issue of agreement.2 42 But scholars have argued
that, at least in some cases involving facilitating practices, courts should
hold firms liable for tacit collusion.2 4 3
A fundamental problem with the existing approaches to facilitating
practices is that they are all based on evaluations of the effects of the facili-
tating practices, not on evaluations of the conspiratory intent of the alleged
coconspirators. For instance, Bill Page argues that "parallel adoption of a
facilitating practice, by itself, cannot justify an inference of a price-fixing
agreement." 2" The reason, according to Page, is that "[b]ecause the practice
will invariably involve some consumer benefit, parallel adoption of it does
not tend to exclude the possibility that each firm is acting independently."245
Focusing on the effects of facilitating practices has limited enforcement
agencies' legal options for attacking facilitating practices because of their
inability to meet the agreement requirement under the Sherman Act. One
example was the Department of Justice's enforcement actions in the GE-
Westinghouse matter.246 In the early 1960s, the DOJ obtained criminal con-
victions and a civil consent decree against three major players in the large
turbine generator industry-GE, Westinghouse, and Allis-Chalmers-based
on evidence of direct communications that the DOJ believed led to price
fixing in the industry. 2 47 Following the issuance of the consent decree, begin-
ning in 1963, GE announced a new set of pricing policies that the DOJ
believed would make it easier for Westinghouse, GE's only remaining com-
petitor, to coordinate with GE on pricing.248 The DOJ believed that the net
effect of GE's new pricing policies was "to make it possible for West-
inghouse to match exactly GE's prices if it wanted to and to give some
assurance to Westinghouse that, in matching GE's published prices, it
would not be incurring any risk of being secretly undercut by selective
241 Page, supra note 132, at 180.
242 See, e.g., Holiday Wholesale Grocery Co. v. Philip Morris, Inc., 231 F.Supp.2d 1253,
1274-75 (N.D. Ga. 2002), af'd, 346 F.3d 1287 (11th Cir. 2003).
243 See POSNER, supra note 108, at 88-89. Donald Turner agreed with Posner on this issue
despite having a more tolerant view of tacit collusion in general. See Turner, supra note 32, at
675-76.
24 Page, supra note 132, at 183.
245 Id.
24 For detailed discussions of the matter, see Hay, supra note 122, at 113-15.
247 See id. at 113-14.
245 See id. at 114. By then, Allis-Chalmers had withdrawn from the large turbine generator
market. See id. GE's new pricing policies included a commitment by GE not to give discounts
in all future transactions, "a revised price book which contained simplified formulas and pro-
cedures for determining the book price of any given turbine generator[,] a published multiplier
to be applied to book prices at any given time," and the use of price protection clauses in all
contracts that would require GE to give past customers retroactive discounts equal to price cuts
given to any new customers. See id.
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discounts." 24 9 Westinghouse adopted its own price book and price protection
clause shortly afterward.2 50 Although the DOJ was convinced that GE's and
Westinghouse's new pricing policies were intended to eliminate price com-
petition, there was no evidence of any formal communication or agreement
between GE and Westinghouse. 25' The DOJ decided to bring a case against
GE and Westinghouse alleging that their new pricing policies brought about
a meeting of minds and constituted an unlawful agreement under Section 1
of the Sherman Act.25 2 But, concerned about litigation risks due to the novel
legal theory employed in this matter, the DOJ chose to settle the case and
entered into a consent decree against GE and Westinghouse. 253
In part because of the uncertainties about how courts would assess
whether parallel adoption of facilitating practices constituted an unlawful
agreement under Section 1, the FTC brought the next enforcement action
involving facilitating practices under Section 5 of the FTC Act, which does
not require a finding of agreement.2 54 In E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co. v.
Federal Trade Comm'n, the FTC alleged that four producers of lead-based
gasoline additives engaged in unfair methods of competition in violation of
Section 5 of the FTC Act when they adopted pricing policies similar to those
at issue in the GE-Westinghouse matter.255 The Second Circuit, however,
declined to find liability, primarily because "[e]ach of the challenged.prac-
tices was initiated by [one producer] ... when [that one producer] was the
sole producer in the industry."2 56 As George Hay points out, "given that the
practices were implemented when there was no competition to worry about,
there was a strong presumption that, at least at that time, there were (poten-
tially significant) efficiencies that resulted from these practices." 257
After the FTC's defeat in E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., the DOJ was
again confronted in the early 1990s with the conundrum of whether parallel
249 Id at 114-15. According to the DOJ, "the combination of the announced no-discount
policy, the . . . simplified price book[,] and the . . . published multiplier" would make it
"much easier for Westinghouse to know what GE would bid on any given turbine generator
project." Id. at 114. The price protection clause would give Westinghouse confidence that GE
would adhere to its announced no-discount policy because selective discounts could not be
employed without "imposing substantial penalties" on GE itself. See id. at 114.
2 50 See id. at 115.
See id.
252 See id.
253 See id. at 115 n.5.
24 Section 5 of the FTC Act prohibits "unfair methods of competition." 15 U.S.C.
§ 45(a)(1) (2019). The FTC has long maintained that Section 5 of the FTC Act covers "both
conduct that violates the Sherman Act and other federal antitrust laws, as well as conduct that
would not necessarily violate the antitrust laws ..... Maureen K. Ohlhausen, Section 5 of the
FTC Act: Principles of Navigation, 2 J. ANTITRUST ENF'T 1, 2 (2014).
255 729 F.2d 128, 133 (2d Cir. 1984). The pricing policies included: (1) quoting prices on a
uniform delivered price basis; (2) announcing price increases to customers and to the press
well in advance of the effective dates of the price increases; and (3) including in contracts with
individual customers a clause requiring the seller to extend to that customer any discount
offered to any other customer. See id.
256 Id.
" Hay, supra note 122, at 117.
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adoption of facilitating practices should be challenged under Section 1 of the
Sherman Act. In the Airline Tariff Publishing case25 8 , major airlines in the
United States allegedly used a computerized Airline Tariff Publishing (ATP)
system to communicate about ticket prices to be charged in the future.25 9 In
particular, the airlines would indicate in the ATP system that they planned to
implement a fare increase at some later date, but not immediately. 2 60 The
DOJ alleged that, through this practice, "[t]he airlines engaged in a process
that involved repeated exchanges through ATP of price increase proposals
and counterproposals, with the effect of raising fares to consumers." 261 The
DOJ claimed that this facilitating practice constituted an unlawful agreement
under Section 1 of the Sherman Act, but they did not elaborate on how. The
DOJ later settled the case with a consent decree prohibiting the use of future
price increase dates. 262
So far, the only successfully litigated Section 1 case against facilitating
practices is the Petroleum Products case, where the Ninth Circuit found that
public dissemination of wholesale prices by defendant oil companies
amounted to an agreement to fix gasoline prices. 263 The court's rationale was
that "the public dissemination of such information served little purpose
other than to facilitate interdependent or collusive price coordination." 264 In
deciding the case, the court was concerned about not deterring legitimate
business conduct.26 5 But the court was not entirely clear how the fact that the
communication served no other legitimate purposes justified its finding of
agreement.
The knowledge theory provides a better way to rationalize the Ninth
Circuit's holding in Petroleum Products. As the court noted, the oil compa-
nies' public dissemination of wholesale prices and dealer discounts was
wholly uncalled for from a business perspective. Such information was not
of immediate significance to retail purchasers, as they were concerned only
with prices at the pump. 2 66 Dealers were already individually notified of any
258 See generally United States v. Airline Tariff Publishing Co., 836 F.Supp. 9 (D.D.C.
1993); United States v. Airline Tariff Publishing Co., No. 92-2854 (SSH), 1994 WL 502091
(D.D.C. 1994).
' See Press Release, Department of Justice, Justice Department Files Price Fixing Suit
Against Eight Airlines and Fare Dissemination System (Dec. 21, 1992), https://www.justice
.gov/archive/atr/public/pressreleases/1992/211323.htm.
260 See id.
261 Id.
262 See Press Release, Department of Justice, Justice Department Settles Airlines Price
Fixing Suit, May Save Consumers Hundreds of Millions of Dollars (Mar. 17, 1994), https://
www.justice.gov/archive/atr/public/pressreleases/1994/211786.htm.
263 See In re Coordinated Pretrial Proceedings in Petroleum Products Antitrust Litigation,
906 F.2d 432, 448 (9th Cir. 1990).
264 Id.
265 At one point, the court stated that the key question was "whether permitting an infer-
ence of conspiracy from the fact of such publication would significantly deter important legiti-
mate conduct." Id.
26 See id.
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changes to wholesale prices or dealer discounts.2 67 Given that the public dis-
semination of wholesale prices and dealer discounts served no legitimate
purposes, the fact that they were still being shared was enough for a reasona-
ble person to conclude that they were shared to signal a tacit offer of con-
spiracy. That tacit offer of conspiracy was accepted when other defendants
adopted the same practice.
The knowledge theory also provides a basis for determining whether
facilitating practices in the other cases should be treated as tacit agreements.
This can be exemplified through the Airline Tariff Publishing case. If airlines
simply share fare information with one another, that communication is per-
fectly normal, because the airlines have a legitimate need for information
about other airlines' fares as they frequently sell seats on other airlines'
flights to their customers. 268 So, when one airline announces a fare change to
other airlines, the other airlines will not be able to tell if the announcer is
providing the price information for that legitimate purpose or signaling its
conspiratory intent. But when an airline announces a price change that will
take effect in the future, that communication may strike other airlines as odd
if price changes with time lags serve no legitimate business purposes. In the
Airline Tariff Publishing case, some travel agents expressed strong support
for advanced price announcements because the announcements allowed con-
sumers to buy tickets at lower prices between the time the price changes
were announced and the time the price changes took effect. 269 If advanced
price announcements serve no such legitimate purposes, then the fact that
they are still being made by the airlines would meet the "oddity" require-
ment under the knowledge theory and would allow airlines to have knowl-
edge of one another's conspiratory intent.
CONCLUSION
With increasingly sophisticated methods of coordination, firms in the
modem economy are able to implement horizontal agreements without
resorting to explicit exchanges of assurances of common actions. Yet the
law's treatment of such tacit agreements is painfully ad hoc and lacks a clear
and consistent logic for determining their existence. This Article attempts to
fill this gap by proposing a unified knowledge theory of tacit agreement.
Under this theory, a tacit agreement arises when the circumstances of the
non-explicit communication are such that a reasonable person would con-
clude that the communication is made to signal the sender's offer or accept-
ance of a conspiracy. The legal formula derived from this theory is
consistent across different types of tacit agreement, yet is flexible enough to
be applied to any factual scenario that may give rise to a tacit agreement.
267 See id.
21 See Hay, supra note 122, at 120.
26 See id. at 121-22.
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